

In The Matter Of:
United States vs.
PFC Bradley E. Manning

Vol. 21
July 25, 2013
UNOFFICIAL DRAFT - 7/25/13 Afternoon Session

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VOLUME XXI

IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

UNITED STATES

VS.

MANNING, Bradley E., PFC COURT-MARTIAL

U.S. Army, xxx-xx-9504

Headquarters and Headquarters Company,

U.S. Army Garrison,

Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall,

Fort Myer, VA 22211

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The Hearing in the above-titled matter was continued on Thursday, July 25, 2013, at 1:30 p.m., at Fort Meade, Maryland, before the Honorable Colonel Denise Lind, Judge.

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1 **APPEARANCES:**

2
3 **ON BEHALF OF GOVERNMENT:**

4 MAJOR ASHDEN FEIN

5 CAPTAIN JOSEPH MORROW

6 CAPTAIN ANGEL OVERGAARD

7 CAPTAIN HUNTER WHYTE

8 CAPTAIN ALEXANDER von Elten

9
10 **ON BEHALF OF ACCUSED:**

11 DAVID COOMBS

12 CAPTAIN JOSHUA TOOMAN

13 MAJOR THOMAS HURLEY

1 PROCEEDINGS,

2 THE JUDGE: Court is called to order. Let
3 the record reflect all parties present when the court
4 last recessed are again present in the court.

5 Major Fein?

6 MR. FEIN: Your Honor, the next dataset
7 CIDNE-Iraq, CIDNE Afghanistan sets. These go to
8 Specifications 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Charge 2.

9 Your Honor, essentially, to use
10 PFC Manning's own Words, the inventory of SIGACTS that
11 he released to WikiLeaks is, quote, one of the more
12 significant documents of our time because it reveals
13 the true nature of the 21st century asymmetric warfare.
14 Prosecution Exhibit 42. The document that was included
15 the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A SIGACTS on the SD card.

16 To truly understand why PFC Manning himself
17 considered these SIGACTS so important begs the
18 question: What is a SIGACT?

19 By definition, a SIGACT is a report of
20 significant activity captured in theater. SIGACTS
21 capture enemy activities, our responses and our TTPs to

1 win our wars.

2 For example, if the military convoy were
3 hit by an IED, that event would be captured in a
4 SIGACT.

5 Your Honor, what else would be captured in
6 a SIGACT? Where and when the attack happened, which
7 unit was involved, the type of IED, how successful the
8 attack was, whether there were any casualties, which
9 enemy organizations are responsible for the attack,
10 what tactical intelligence we gathered from the attack
11 and what steps we took in response to the attack.
12 Simply put, Your Honor, SIGACTS detail how we defeat
13 our enemies and what enemies use to harm us.

14 Your Honor, how do we use SIGACTS?

15 Mr. Hall testified that commanders in the
16 field use SIGACTS every day to make tactical decisions.

17 Mr. Hall testified that intelligence
18 analysts are often tasked to provide the commander with
19 insights into what events have taken place along, for
20 example, a main supply route over a certain period of
21 time.

1 Intelligence analysts pull all SIGACTS
2 taking place on that supply road. They plot those
3 events on a map so that the commander can visualize the
4 enemy and what the enemy is doing or not doing.

5 These aids help the commander understand
6 the enemy trends and decide whether to continue using
7 that supply route or redirect the convoy in a different
8 direction.

9 Commanders use SIGACTS every day to make
10 decisions to defeat the enemy and protect our soldiers.

11 As Captain Fulton testified, the commander
12 of 210 Mountain relied on her predictive analysis and
13 he was no different. Captain Fulton, on a weekly
14 basis, briefed Colonel Miller on enemy trends they were
15 identified based off of SIGACTS by PFC Manning. Those
16 SIGACTS helped Colonel Miller decide how to employ the
17 sources, protect soldiers.

18 Sergeant First Class Anica, he also gave
19 the court an example of how the date of a SIGACT does
20 not necessarily correlate to its value to commanders.
21 He testified about an event that happened during a

1 previous deployment where two soldiers were captured by
2 enemy forces. He explained how the unit reviewed
3 SIGACTS for the three to four years to determine what
4 enemy was located in that area and what tactics,
5 techniques and procedures those in that area employed
6 in order to figure out where those two soldiers could
7 be found.

8 Those SIGACTS help the unit determine who
9 was responsible for the captured and where they were
10 being held captured.

11 Sergeant First Class Anica testified that
12 he trained PFC Manning prior to the deployment on the
13 use of SIGACTS and how critical they are, even older
14 SIGACTS and how the enemy understands our forces.

15 Why do we store SIGACTS in SIPRNET?

16 SIGACTS are only available on SIPRNET
17 because they're an invaluable resource that is
18 released, Your Honor, to the enemy to not only teach
19 them about our TTPs but reveal what we know about them.

20 Each intelligence professional from 210
21 Mountain testified to this point. They testified that

1 with this tactical insight, the enemy can adjust and
2 become more successful in carrying out their attacks.

3 Why do we safeguard the tactical reports?
4 Because those reports help us to make all the tactical
5 decisions necessary to defeat the enemies.

6 The value of the tactical reports correlate
7 to the exclusive use and benefit of this information.
8 This is the type of information PFC Manning disclosed
9 to WikiLeaks knowing that terrorist organizations use
10 WikiLeaks to gather intelligence such as the marine
11 table (inaudible).

12 This is not purely historical data without
13 any value as the defense argued. Instead, this is
14 data, this data is extremely valuable for our
15 commanders as part of the military decision-making
16 process to make realtime decisions that ultimately save
17 our lives.

18 Furthermore, Your Honor, the value of the
19 tactical information to our enemies is without
20 question -- well, is without question the value,
21 especially given the fact that OBL himself, Osama bin

1 Laden himself, asked for information and received it,
2 the SIGACTS from the CIDNE database for Afghanistan.

3 And now, because of PFC Manning, this is
4 the type of tactical information that was and is in the
5 hands of OBL on the day he died and currently in the
6 hands of all enemies of the United States.

7 Your Honor, the Combined Information Data
8 Network, CIDNE, is the direct reporting system used by
9 all forces within the US CENTCOM.

10 The program manager testified that he's
11 (inaudible) to separately track our combine operations
12 in Iraq and also track in Afghanistan.

13 Your Honor, you heard testimony that a
14 significant activity generally consists of key leader
15 engagements, mission report logs which track troop
16 movements (inaudible), focus on duty, status
17 whereabouts and known DUST worm, which will you
18 describe the names of captured or missing service
19 members in the TTP that we employ to locate our missing
20 service members.

21 Captain Lim testified that SIGACTS also

1 include the names of detained persons and local
2 nationals, some of whom made these sources for
3 neighboring U.S. source forces, (inaudible). Certain
4 weaponry they use against the United States.

5 Your Honor, within seven weeks of having
6 access to SIPRNET, PFC Manning deliberately chose to
7 download and steal a portion of the CIDNE-I Iraq
8 database containing more than 380,000 SIGACTS and a
9 portion of the CIDNE-A Afghanistan database containing
10 more than 90,000 SIGACTS.

11 PFC Manning had extensive experience
12 dealing with SIGACTS at Fort Drum and FOB Hammer.

13 PFC Manning provided weekly briefings based
14 on SIGACTS based off also their anticipated need
15 because they were going to employ first Afghanistan and
16 then Iraq.

17 At FOB Hammer, members of the PFC Manning
18 unit testified that PFC Manning had constant exposure
19 to AO, particularly the SIGACTS related to IEDs.

20 So what did Private First Class Manning do
21 with these trained skills? Starting in late December

1 of 2009 he began exporting hundreds of thousands of
2 SIGACTS from 2004 to 2009. That's six years or 72
3 months of SIGACTS from two different databases.

4 The CIDNE databases contained an export
5 feature to allow intelligence analysts to export
6 SIGACTS in 30-day increments as part of their study of
7 enemy trends over a period of time.

8 Therefore, in order to export the SIGACTS,
9 Private First Class Manning had to export them in
10 monthly increments.

11 Put another way, he had to click the export
12 classic Excel function on the bottom right of the CIDNE
13 screen. He had to push it 72 times per database to
14 accomplish this feat. That's a total of 144 times he
15 had to click export to take all the SIGACTS from
16 CIDNE-A and I databases at this time, the first part of
17 January.

18 Pulling the SIGACTS from the CIDNE
19 Afghanistan database even required more diligence and
20 advanced understanding of the networks on SIPRNET.

21 PFC Manning was stationed in Iraq at the

1 time, deployed in Iraq.

2 The main CIDNE Afghanistan database was
3 inaccessible in Afghanistan, a specific design
4 limitation.

5 Mr. Holifeld testified that CENTCOM
6 maintained CIDNE servers in Tampa as well as both
7 theaters of operation in Iraq and Afghanistan.

8 The CIDNE-Iraq and Afghanistan servers do
9 not share the same information.

10 The CIDNE Afghanistan database is only
11 available to users hooked up to servers located in
12 Afghanistan or the backup server in Tampa.

13 Your Honor, the defense seems to imply that
14 PFC Manning downloaded SIGACTS to create local backup
15 disks. In case the SIPRNET or D6-A doesn't work, the
16 defense presented no evidence that this actually
17 occurred. In fact, the evidence for CIDNE-A is to the
18 contrary.

19 Special Agent Shaver testified that
20 PFC Manning's computer connected with the CIDNE
21 Afghanistan server in Tampa between 1 and 7

1 January 2010, the Centaur logs, again measuring net
2 flow data captured this activity that's at Prosecution
3 Exhibit 152, Your Honor.

4 The logs also show that the only times that
5 PFC Manning's computer connected to the CIDNE-A servers
6 in Tampa were between 1 and 7 January 2010 and no other
7 time in the 103 days recorded in the Centaur logs.

8 Mr. Holifeld testified that PFC Manning
9 pulled the last batch of SIGACTS from the SIGACT Iraq
10 database on 3 January 2010, on 3 January 2010.

11 He also testified that PFC Manning pulled
12 the batch of SIGACTS from CIDNE-A database four days
13 later, on 7 January 2010, 7 January, 2010.

14 Private Manning stored the CIDNE databases
15 in a password protected folder named yadda dot tar dot
16 bz2 at dot NC. You heard from Special Agent Shaver,
17 and that was on an SD card that was later found and
18 admitted as PE92.

19 Special Agent Shaver also testified that
20 this folder on the SD card was created on 30
21 January 2010.

1 He testified that he was able to view the
2 content of this folder by using the same password
3 PFC Manning provided Adrian Lamo on his chats.

4 He testified that within the yadda folder
5 there were three different files in that encrypted
6 file.

7 The portions of the CIDNE-I and CIDNE-A
8 databases containing the SIGACTS were stored under the
9 file names Iraq underscore events dot CSV -- excuse me,
10 IRQ underscore events dot CSV and AFG underscore events
11 dot CSV.

12 These are two CSV files which you've heard
13 is essentially the same as an Excel spreadsheet.

14 Special Agent Shaver testified that the
15 file name IRQ dot CSQ was last written on 5
16 January 2010 and the Afghanistan file was written three
17 days later, 8 January 2010.

18 Your Honor, we knew that PFC Manning took
19 his SD card containing more than 470,000 SIGACTS from
20 the CIDNE-A and CIDNE-I databases with him on R and R.

21 Special Agent Mander testified that SD card

1 was found at PFC Manning's aunt's house at Potomac,
2 Maryland where he stayed during R and R. It was during
3 this time in R and R when PFC Manning transferred the
4 SIGACTS from his personal computer to WikiLeaks and
5 then his SD card onto his SD card for safekeeping.

6 Your Honor, the evidence shows that the
7 transmission occurred prior to 1 February 2010 while
8 PFC Manning was in Boston visiting friends. A transfer
9 to WikiLeaks occurred prior to 1 February, 2010, while
10 PFC Manning was in Boston.

11 How do we know this? PFC Manning
12 forensically wiped his computer and reinstalled the
13 operator system on 30 January 2010. Prosecution
14 Exhibit Alpha and 126 Bravo are the install logs from
15 PFC Manning's personal computer.

16 THE JUDGE: What was the Prosecution
17 Exhibit?

18 MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am, Prosecution Exhibit
19 126 Alpha and Bravo.

20 PFC Manning's aunt testified that while on
21 R and R leave PFC Manning left Potomac, Maryland on 25

1 January and returned on 1 February 2010.

2 The disk utility log from PFC Manning's
3 personal computer, that's Prosecution Exhibit 125,
4 Prosecution Exhibit 125 and specifically lines 78
5 through 86. 78 through 86 show PFC Manning executing a
6 7-pass disk erase. After three hours and 48 minutes it
7 was complete, forensically wiping his machine on 31
8 January 20,10, not one time, Your Honor, seven times,
9 and after three hours it was complete.

10 Mr. Johnson testified that, based off his
11 review of this log, that PFC Manning successfully wiped
12 all of the evidence that had been deleted on his
13 personal computer on this date. This occurred while he
14 was still in Boston.

15 Your Honor, Defense Exhibit Juliet, Defense
16 Exhibit Juliet is the forensic report for PFC Manning's
17 personal Macintosh computer.

18 Prosecution Exhibit 179. Prosecution
19 Exhibit 179 are all the attachments and enclosures to
20 that report.

21 Other than the one SIGACT that Special

1 Agent Shaver was able to recover from March 2010 on his
2 personal map, there are no other SIGACTS on the
3 computer, not a single remnant of 470,000 SIGACTS from
4 30 January 2010 and forward -- excuse me -- 31
5 January 2010 on his personal computer.

6 The only reasonable explanation for this,
7 Your Honor, is that PFC Manning erased any evidence of
8 the transmission of the SIGACT to WikiLeaks when he
9 wiped the free space on his computer on 31 January
10 2010.

11 Otherwise, some remnant of the 470,000
12 SIGACTS would likely be on his computer like the volume
13 dot txt and other recovered documents. The
14 transmission had to have occurred prior to 31
15 January 2010.

16 Once returning from Boston, PFC Manning
17 left that SD card along with other possessions of his
18 at his aunt's house in Maryland, and that's after
19 disclosing the SIGACTS to WikiLeaks while he was in
20 Boston.

21 Located in that same encrypted file with

1 the SIGACTS on the SD card, PFC Manning wrote and
2 stored a document he called read me dot text admitted
3 into evidence as PE42.

4 Your Honor, displayed on the screen is
5 PE42. WikiLeaks, note to WikiLeaks, PFC Manning note
6 to WikiLeaks explaining the items of historic
7 significance, although he ignored his training and
8 experience when it came to compromising classified
9 information.

10 It is clear he applied the same training
11 and experience to identify the SIGACTS themselves were
12 historical significance and compilation was more of
13 significant documents.

14 Your Honor, what did PFC Manning also know
15 in late January 2010, that this information was also
16 significant to the enemies of the United States,
17 removing the fog of war that protected us from
18 unconventional enemies and those that fight on the
19 asymmetric battlefield.

20 Although he is the source of these SIGACTS
21 would be protected if the information was sat on for

1 perhaps 90 to 100 days, he would be protected as the
2 source if it was sat on between 90 and 180 days.

3 He knew, he knew that all of the
4 intelligence and individuals named within those reports
5 would never be protected once it was removed from the
6 classified SIPRNET system and released to the world.

7 Your Honor, again that is Prosecution
8 Exhibit 42.

9 Your Honor, how proud was PFC Manning of
10 his actions knowing he was able to get away with this
11 and finally start down the path of obtaining the
12 worldwide notoriety.

13 You've seen the picture, Prosecution
14 Exhibit 40, with the same read me dot text file. He
15 stood smiling at his aunt's house holding the same
16 camera that -- the SD card on the camera in this
17 picture had 417,000 SIGACTS, the read me dot text file
18 that he wanted to sit on the information and protect
19 him smiling in that photo, and not protect the Iraqi
20 and Afghanis and U.S. soldiers and everyone else in all
21 the missions in Afghanistan.

1 In this particular (inaudible), Your Honor,
2 this is not a picture of a person, of a troubled person
3 conflicted by his action as the defense wants you to
4 believe. This is a picture of a person who thought he
5 was finally becoming famous with that information on
6 the SD card.

7 Your Honor, the CIDNE SIGACTS were the
8 first large scale thefts of information by PFC Manning.
9 It is clear that PFC Manning viewed the SD card as his
10 own trophy for his accomplishments.

11 Could he have kept the information erased
12 on his personal computer and not copied over to SD card
13 after disclosing the contents to WikiLeaks? Yes. But
14 just like he created the mock tasking order that we
15 would talk about later detailing his intent,
16 PFC Manning wanted to forever memorialize for himself
17 the fruit to his labor as he continued to exfiltrate
18 U.S. Government databases and portions thereof.

19 Even five months later, Your Honor, on
20 26 May 2010, PFC Manning stated to Adrian Lamo that he
21 provided what he called highlights of the disclosures

1 which included the SIGACTS within the CIDNE databases.
2 That's on page 46, Your Honor, of the Lamo chats. Thus
3 admitted to providing portions of the CIDNE-A and A
4 database to WikiLeaks and recognizing the inherent
5 importance of these documents.

6 When PFC Manning extracted records from the
7 CIDNE database to his personal computer, he completed
8 his theft of those records.

9 The SIGACTS from the CIDNE databases are
10 stored on a classified system and only available to
11 authorized personnel with a need to know and who could
12 access them on SIPRNET.

13 At no time was PFC Manning authorized to
14 house those records on his personal laptop or on his SD
15 card at his aunt's house.

16 Furthermore, PFC Manning converted the
17 information of the records from the CIDNE databases
18 from, he conveyed them to WikiLeaks for publication.

19 PFC Manning specifically intended for the
20 records to be released and WikiLeaks obliged. The
21 United States devoted significant resources to protect

1 this classified information.

2 Mr. Lewis testified that foreign
3 intelligence services will pay for the information
4 precisely because its exclusive possession provides a
5 significant benefit to the United States. The
6 publication of SIGACTS from the CIDNE databases
7 completely deprived the United States of this exclusive
8 possession of the use of that information.

9 Your Honor, PFC Manning knew the charge
10 documents for specifications 5 and 7 of charge 2 were
11 classified. These documents are probably marked secret
12 within the classified information field of SIGACT
13 reports.

14 Further, these documents are located on
15 SIPRNET and the United States has not made these
16 documents available to the public. They were closely
17 held.

18 The charged documents themselves for
19 specifications 5 and 7 of charge 2 relates to the
20 national defense of the United States. Lieutenant
21 Commander Hoskins and Lieutenant Colonel Nehring both

1 testified the documents contained a type of information
2 which would cause serious harm to national security and
3 thus should be secret.

4 It was the type of information that could
5 be useful to our adversaries and the type of
6 information that PFC Manning knew would be useful to
7 the adversaries.

8 Admiral (inaudible) US CENTCOM deputy
9 commander and the OCA testified that the charge
10 documents within both datasets, the CIDNE-I SIGACTS and
11 CIDNE-A SIGACTS, are classified at secret level because
12 their release could cause harm to national security.

13 Your Honor, if I may have a moment.

14 THE JUDGE: Yes.

15 MR. FEIN: Your Honor, PFC Manning and
16 Major Hurley have relocated to the witness box in order
17 to look at classified information and I have handed
18 them each a copy and the Court Appellate Exhibit 617,
19 the government classified supplemented closing
20 argument.

21 Your Honor, Mr. Lewis testified that the

1 value of the SIGACTS from the CIDNE-A database far
2 exceeds the statutory minimums.

3 Specifically, Mr. Lewis testified that the
4 Foreign Intelligence Services of multiple countries
5 actively seek information contained within the SIGACTS
6 and would pay money from the SIGACTS from CIDNE
7 Afghanistan.

8 The Foreign Intelligence Services seek
9 information pertaining to the United States military
10 tactics, techniques and procedures, TTPs, which show
11 operation strategies, responses to attacks and the
12 units involved in TTPs and military operations in
13 Afghanistan detailed in classified reason number 1.

14 Your Honor, when you're finished looking at
15 classified reason 1, would you please let me know and
16 I'll continue.

17 THE JUDGE: I have.

18 MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am.

19 Your Honor, Mr. Lewis testified that
20 country 1 would pay at least \$10,000 for the
21 compromised SIGACTS from the CIDNE-A database and

1 Mr. Lewis called his valuation conservative as set
2 forth in classified reason 2.

3 Your Honor, a Foreign Intelligence Service
4 has paid \$50 each for documents containing information
5 similar to that found in the SIGACTS. Mr. Lewis
6 determined that a Foreign Intelligence Service would
7 value at least 30 percent of the SIGACTS from the
8 CIDNE-A database.

9 Based on Mr. Lewis' evaluation and the
10 price paid per document, the 90,000 SIGACTS from the
11 CIDNE-A database are worth approximately \$1.3 million
12 to a Foreign Intelligence Service.

13 Your Honor, that is 30 percent of 90,000
14 documents times \$50.

15 Your Honor, Mr. Lewis also testified that
16 the value of the SIGACTS from the CIDNE-I Iraq database
17 far exceeded the statutory minimums.

18 Specifically, Mr. Lewis testified that the
19 Foreign Intelligence Services of multiple countries
20 actively seek information contained in the SIGACTS and
21 would pay for SIGACTS from the CIDNE-I rack database.

1 The Foreign Intelligence Services seek
2 information pertaining to the United States military
3 tactics and procedures which show operational
4 strategies, responses to attacks and the units involved
5 in TTPs of military operations in Iraq as detailed in
6 classified reason number 3.

7 Mr. Lewis testified that country 2 would
8 pay at least \$10,000 for the records in the CIDNE-I
9 rack, the SIGACTS in the CIDNE-I rack database, and
10 Mr. Lewis called his valuation conservative as set
11 forth in classified reason 4.

12 A Foreign Intelligence Service has paid \$50
13 for documents containing information similar to that
14 found in the SIGACT. Mr. Lewis determined that a
15 Foreign Intelligence Service would value at least
16 10 percent of the SIGACTS from the CIDNE-I database.

17 Based on Mr. Lewis' evaluation, the price
18 paid per document, the 380,000 records, SIGACTS in the
19 CIDNE-I database are worth approximately \$1.9 million
20 to a Foreign Intelligence Service which is 10 percent
21 of \$3,850,000 times \$50.

1 Your Honor, at this point I'm going to move
2 on to the ACIC document which doesn't necessarily --
3 doesn't require any classified enclosures to be
4 referenced.

5 THE JUDGE: Do you request to retrieve them
6 and have PFC Manning go back to the table?

7 MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am, I do. So the United
8 States requests that I will collect those documents and
9 continue.

10 Your Honor, United States retrieved
11 Appellate Exhibit 617 from the court and PFC Manning
12 and Major Hurley.

13 Your Honor, the next document, compromised
14 document is the ACIC document and this goes to
15 specification 1 -- excuse me, Your Honor -- 1 and 15
16 mostly for (inaudible) offense, Your Honor,
17 specification 15 Charge 2.

18 Your Honor, the ACIC report is a charge
19 document. The declassified version of the document is
20 at Prosecution Exhibit 45 and the original classified
21 version is at Prosecution Exhibit 46, 45 and 46.

1 Your Honor, the ACIC report provided
2 PFC Manning with the actual knowledge that the enemies
3 of the United States would use classified information
4 obtained from WikiLeaks against the United States and
5 knowing that PFC Manning deliberately disclosed this
6 document, this document to the world through WikiLeaks.

7 Ms. Gwynn testified about the Army
8 Counterintelligence Center's process for creating
9 intelligence products like self-initiated special
10 report charged tier. She also addressed the center's
11 meticulous sources program.

12 With regard to the report significance, she
13 explained the mission of the cyber counterintelligence
14 assessments branch where he worked as a senior analyst
15 was to identify the specific threats using predictive
16 analysis and use work product like the charge ACIC
17 document that she explained reflects that objective.

18 Your Honor, in this case the 18 March 2008
19 report describes in detail what the other research of
20 WikiLeaks.org revealed about the nature, operations and
21 actions of WikiLeaks in 2008. Its purpose was to

1 assess the counterintelligence threat posed to the
2 United States Army by the WikiLeaks website.

3 Specifically, the ACIC report analyzes the
4 threat posed by WikiLeaks following the release of the
5 U.S. Army table of equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan
6 from April 2007 and the release of other classified
7 U.S. government information.

8 The report's key judgments communicate
9 three main points, Your Honor. That WikiLeaks
10 represents potential force protection
11 counterintelligence OPSEC and INFOSEC threat to U.S.
12 Army, pages 3 and 4 Prosecution Exhibit 45.

13 Recent unauthorized releases of DoD
14 sensitive and classified information provide Foreign
15 Intelligence Services, foreign terrorist groups and
16 other adversaries with potential actionable information
17 for targeting U.S. forces.

18 And WikiLeaks most likely has other DoD
19 sensitive classified information in its possession and
20 will continue to post it on their website.

21 Your Honor, the ACIC report goes on to

1 discuss DoD classified information that WikiLeaks had
2 released in the past and how WikiLeaks posts all
3 information that it received without editorial
4 oversight.

5 The basic report concludes that and
6 PFC Manning knew that it must also be presumed that
7 foreign adversaries will review and assess any DoD
8 sensitive or classified information posted to that
9 website.

10 The document warned readers of adversaries'
11 increased ability to complete rapid data compilations
12 to more efficiently develop actionable information,
13 intelligence collection, planning or targeting purposes
14 against the United States.

15 That's on page 21, Your Honor, of
16 Prosecution Exhibit 45.

17 So you'll see, Your Honor, that this charge
18 document serves as another warning to PFC Manning as to
19 the dangers of posting information on the internet
20 generally and once more on WikiLeaks specifically.

21 Given the accused's experience with the

1 classified information of classified documents and the
2 types of information contained in that report as well
3 as its markings, the accused knew that the unauthorized
4 release of that single report itself could cause
5 serious damage to national security.

6 As you heard from Ms. Gwynn, the ACIC
7 document is only available on SIPRNET. At the time it
8 was taken from the U.S. Government or on (inaudible)
9 and transmitted to WikiLeaks and ultimately posted to
10 the internet.

11 The report was marked secret at the top and
12 bottom of each of the 32 pages which (inaudible) to
13 PFC Manning that it was a classified information and
14 should be treated as such.

15 Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibit 181 Alpha,
16 181 Alpha is the classified stipulation expected
17 testimony for the original classification authority of
18 that document and it further explains why the ACIC
19 report is national defense information and was properly
20 classified at the secret level. Prosecution Exhibit
21 181 Alpha.

1 Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibit 84 is a
2 summary of the Intelink logs produced by Special Agent
3 Shaver to annotate the exact time PFC Manning
4 downloaded this document and viewed the ACIC document
5 for Intel.

6 This shows PFC Manning accessed the web
7 page that contained the document dot ASP version and
8 the document version, that's the Microsoft Office
9 document, the DOC version of the ACIC report on 29
10 December 2009, 14 February 2010, 1 March 2010, and all
11 that from his dot 40 SIPRNET computer.

12 Your Honor, Mr. Arteli, the ACIC website
13 administrator, he testified that Prosecution Exhibit
14 63, an IP address associated with PFC Manning accessed
15 the ACIC website containing the ACIC report on 1
16 December 2009 and subsequently on 29 December, 1 March
17 and 7 March.

18 Mr. Chamberlain testified that the IP
19 address addresses dot 22 and dot 40 accessed ACIC
20 server 114 times beginning on 19 November 2009 and that
21 is reflected in the server logs, Prosecution Exhibit

1 64.

2 THE JUDGE: How many times did you say?

3 MR. FEIN: Your Honor, 114 times beginning
4 on 19 November 2009 which is essentially within a few
5 days of PFC Manning having access to SIPRNET without a
6 soldier to his left or right during RIP/TOA.

7 Your Honor, the first time the United
8 States can prove PFC Manning viewed the ACIC report was
9 on 1 December although he accessed the website on 19
10 November. PFC Manning was on the ACIC website viewing
11 that document weeks before Christmas Eve of 2009.

12 Your Honor, what did PFC Manning do after
13 reading the ACIC document, ignoring the warnings
14 enumerated in the document and then compromise the ACIC
15 document to WikiLeaks. He obsessively followed its
16 release and (inaudible) in the amount of press the
17 release was receiving.

18 And in the Assange chat PFC Manning makes
19 clear his need to monitor the attention his actions
20 were receiving.

21 PFC Manning told Julian Assange that a US

1 Government official, Lieutenant Colonel Packnett,
2 confirmed the authenticity of the ACIC reports to the
3 New York Times laughing this action is contravention of
4 the typical policy to protect classified information by
5 neither confirming or denying the authenticity of
6 classified information.

7 Your Honor, that's clearly stated in the
8 Assange chats page 13.

9 Your Honor, the accused repeatedly searched
10 cables on WikiLeaks. He repeatedly accessed it and
11 ultimately disclosed it to WikiLeaks. The intelligence
12 report relates to national defense discussing
13 specifically our vulnerabilities to WikiLeaks and the
14 terrorist organizations their actions aid.

15 This document was classified and not
16 released publicly until PFC Manning took it upon
17 himself to unilaterally decide the world, including the
18 enemies of this country, should receive it.

19 Your Honor, the next charged document is
20 the Apache video. This is specification 2 of charge 2.

21 Though edited by WikiLeaks and PFC Manning

1 for release, the video is compromised by PFC Manning
2 with over 38 minutes of footage from United States to
3 the Apache helicopter.

4 Ultimately, the WikiLeaks was posted to the
5 world on 5-8-2010, to the activist organization on 15
6 February 2010.

7 With regard to the content of the video,
8 Your Honor, you heard primarily from Chief Warrant
9 Officer 5 John LaRue has been an Apache helicopter
10 pilot more than quarter of a century flying Apache
11 helicopters. (Inaudible) depicts the display of the
12 Apache helicopter.

13 He shows the angles of depicts how pilots
14 use technology on aircraft and exposes our use of laser
15 technology to obtain key metrics.

16 Overall, the video documents the actions
17 and experiences of U.S. service members conducting a
18 wartime mission.

19 With regard to the manner in which the
20 video is treated, Chief LaRue testified that the
21 footage contains a sort of information preserved to

1 facilitate lessons learned by our aviation community
2 and that protected from compromise by placement on
3 SIPRNET system.

4 The information is reviewed and sanitized
5 prior to any potential public release. Although the
6 Apache video is classified, it's sensitive.

7 The senior pilot testified that this
8 information is the same type he had been taught and
9 himself teaches never to release.

10 Why is that, Your Honor?

11 As Chief LaRue explained, this information
12 benefits our adversaries by communicating our tactics,
13 techniques and procedures and informing them on the
14 limitations of the U.S. government's technology.

15 Your Honor, the defense would have you
16 believe that a verbatim transcript of the incident had
17 already been made public and this somehow showed the
18 video wasn't closely held and excuses the accused's
19 conduct. This United States myth is actually a red
20 herring.

21 Just as purported state cables contain

1 topics also addressed in open source material, so is
2 true the incident depicted in the charged video was no
3 secret.

4 However, just like every other piece of
5 protected U.S. government material in this case, at no
6 point was the entirety of this video officially
7 released and no point were images made public and no
8 point was the TTP information contained disclosed.
9 Even the book itself didn't describe the weapons or
10 engagement response.

11 Moreover, the transcript in the Finkel book
12 is not actually verbatim although the portions are
13 similar. There's been no evidence that the embedded
14 journalist ever saw the video, and the author mentions
15 the sensitivity of protecting the sources and methods
16 from which the content is derived, the content of his
17 book.

18 What's more is that based especially AIT
19 and on-the-job training already discussed, PFC Manning
20 knew the value of the video to the enemy as well as the
21 need to protect the information it contained.

1 Disregarding the sensitivity of this
2 material, PFC Manning thought the video was cool and
3 decided to release it to a bunch of anti-government
4 activists and anarchists to achieve a maximum exposure,
5 the maximum exposure and advance his personal quest for
6 notoriety.

7 Ultimately, this video is released by
8 WikiLeaks, yet PFC Manning's involvement in this tale
9 and the compromised region as far back the December of
10 the previous year. PFC Manning saw, researched,
11 released and then assisted in doctoring the video for
12 maximum impact, all notwithstanding his understanding
13 of the nature of the material.

14 PFC Manning first saw the video in December
15 of 2009 with soldiers in unit. Ms. Showman, Captain
16 Fulton, Chief Balonek all testified that the video was
17 located on the unit SIPRNET, their SIPRNET share drive.

18 This drive Captain Cherepko testified was
19 acceptable to any individuals with appropriate
20 clearance such as PFC Manning and his analyst
21 colleagues.

1 Your Honor, 22 January 2010, 22
2 January 2010, PFC Manning left Iraq for his R and R
3 leave. During this time he erased his computer in
4 order to destroy any evidence regarding the Gharani
5 video and the CIDNE databases, the SIGACTS portions of
6 the CIDNE databases.

7 By this point, Your Honor, in 22 January
8 2010, PFC Manning realized that his previous Gharani
9 leak would not be released any time soon because it was
10 encrypted. This reality was essentially utterly
11 unsatisfactory to them.

12 Through researching the event, PFC Manning
13 released the Apache incident had been subject to a FOIA
14 quest. This Apache video was his opportunity to and
15 therefore would be his next target.

16 PFC Manning, returning to theater on 14
17 February 2010, less than 24 hours later on 15
18 February 2010 he burned the Apache footage and its
19 associated documents onto a disk from his SIPRNET D6-A
20 computer and he took that material out of the T-SCIF to
21 his shoe where he loaded into his personal McNamara

1 computer uploaded 20 WikiLeaks.

2 That video, along with the Reykjavik 13
3 learn cable and (inaudible), Your Honor, this is shown
4 by the forensic evidence.

5 Prosecution Exhibit 127 is the volume dot
6 TXT document line 1, line 1 on PE127 shows the Apache
7 file name which was the same name he used for the file
8 in the disk found in his shoe at the time of his
9 arrest.

10 However, Your Honor, compromising Apache
11 video to WikiLeaks wasn't going to be enough for
12 PFC Manning. The entire video would not make the
13 splash he wanted and garner the attention he craved.

14 PFC Manning didn't get the reaction he
15 desperately wanted from that Gharani video. It
16 couldn't be released because WikiLeaks didn't have the
17 password. This meant that PFC Manning was deprived the
18 notoriety his actions deserved.

19 If WikiLeaks didn't make the press, how
20 could he be the one that hailed the source.
21 PFC Manning wanted to make sure this video, this video

1 that the day after he got back from R and R made the
2 biggest splash and it received the most attention.

3 So accordingly, Your Honor, PFC Manning
4 ultimately participated in editing the video which
5 would later be released by WikiLeaks under the name of
6 "Collateral Murder."

7 Your Honor, this is Prosecution Exhibit 41.
8 Page 1 an e-mail between PFC Manning and Mr. Schmidle.

9 Note, please, Your Honor, that PFC Manning
10 credits himself in this e-mail with, quote, approving
11 the edits and instructing the quotation inclusion.

12 Paragraph one of his own e-mail. I approve
13 the edits without actually viewing the video, had a
14 written description.

15 Then he talks about instructing the, well,
16 quote, paragraph 3. You should note too, Your Honor,
17 the hypocrisy for professing all the information needed
18 to be public, PFC Manning did not seek to release the
19 whole video but rather an edited version to maximize
20 impact.

21 And instead of leading the people he wanted

1 so much to have the information, free to assess it.

2 There should be no transmitted. The only thing --

3 (Whereupon, there were announcements in the
4 media room interrupting audio.)

5 MR. FEIN: Your Honor, these are not the
6 actions of a naive person stumbling onto something he
7 thought should be made public. Instead, this a capable
8 soldier being trained with his experience regarding the
9 enemy's priorities and resources and with an agenda,
10 Your Honor, he's a soldier that can't live on his
11 skills, training and access for his own personal gain.
12 He put himself before his country even with this video,
13 Your Honor.

14 Virtually each click of his mouse on
15 SIPRNET was motivated by his request for the biggest
16 impact and the widest notoriety. With the editing of
17 the Apache helicopter video, he knew he would get a
18 reaction. Over and over he conducted open source, he
19 (inaudible).

20 First, Your Honor, PFC Manning conducted
21 searches for Reuters, Apache helicopter video related

1 items 51 times, 51 times in 36 days between March and
2 April of 2010. This is all in the Intel link search
3 summary, Prosecution Exhibit 81, lines 534 through 668,
4 534 through 668.

5 THE JUDGE: That's Prosecution what?

6 MR. FEIN: 81, Your Honor, Intelink search
7 logs.

8 PFC Manning used search to search open
9 source articles on the SIPRNET system 61 times. He
10 also edited the collateral one murder video on his dot
11 source computer.

12 In an effort to obtain immediate notoriety,
13 although in a clandestined form PFC Manning brought to
14 the attention of Captain Fulton who compared the link
15 share drive video to verify a match noting her
16 reaction, he burned the souvenir copy three days later.

17 Then in May PFC Manning discussed via
18 e-mail his role in editing that video as you saw a
19 moment ago to Mr. Schmidle saying he was glad it made
20 an impact in connecting it to the CIDNE actual reports
21 of the SIGACTS.

1 Finally, PFC Manning's own aunt testified
2 that PFC Manning asked her to post the edited version
3 on his Facebook account after being confined.

4 The theme here is PFC Manning's consistent
5 cavalier attitude towards this material. Manning knew
6 the importance of the information and that it was only
7 available on SIPRNET.

8 He even thought it was classified. So
9 based on his knowledge, training and experience, he
10 knew it was not publicly available.

11 Ms. Scott, the chief of FOIA and privacy
12 section for U.S. CENTCOM, she testified while the
13 investigation has been released to the public through
14 FOIA, this specific video was not released.

15 At every turn, Your Honor, PFC Manning's
16 handling and treatment of this video has been a
17 violation of the United States.

18 PFC Manning copied what later determined to
19 be an unclassified video, took to his room for
20 unclassified use to (inaudible) what he thought was an
21 intelligence (inaudible).

1 Your Honor, he took these deliberate steps
2 even when the book he talked about in these chats, self
3 claimed measuring stick for this disclosure revealed
4 the author had not released the entire video transcript
5 and did not release any images from the video itself,
6 and it deliberately protected sources and methods
7 within his own book, page 285, and Prosecution Exhibit
8 186.

9 Your Honor, the next section, password
10 cracking, specification 1 charge 3. You've heard --

11 THE JUDGE: What?

12 MR. FEIN: I'm sorry. Specification 1,
13 Your Honor, of charge 3.

14 THE JUDGE: Okay.

15 MR. FEIN: Your Honor, you've heard
16 overwhelming evidence that PFC Manning started using
17 his access to SIPRNET less than two weeks after
18 starting work in the SCIF at FOB Hammer.

19 By March 2010, the accused stole and
20 transmitted over 20,000 documents and watched the
21 world's reaction to the cables released.

1 One of the topics the United States did not
2 highlight were some of the things PFC Manning conducted
3 on SIPRNET related to obfuscating his internet
4 activity.

5 Between 6 December '09 and 8 March 2010,
6 PFC Manning searched 19 times on SIPRNET for terms such
7 as encryption, and that's what PFC Manning described to
8 Ms. McNamara as encryption that has gone 12 years not
9 being broken in his chats. And MD5, which is an
10 algorithm for hashing files.

11 Then, on 8 March 2010 at 22:28, so
12 10:28 p.m., PFC Manning used his access to SIPRNET to
13 search for rainbow tables --

14 THE JUDGE: What date was that?

15 MR. FEIN: Ma'am, that's on 8 March 2010,
16 at 22:28:21 seconds. More importantly, Your Honor,
17 it's line 417 of Prosecution Exhibit 81. Line 417
18 Prosecution Exhibit 81.

19 That search was for rainbow tables. Why
20 would PFC Manning be doing research on rainbow tables.
21 It's pretty obvious when you put the pieces together

1 and gets to the heart of Specification 1 of charge 3.

2 We know that PFC Manning was obsessed with
3 covering his own tracks. We know this from his
4 personal Mac information erasure on 31 January 2010.
5 He performed a 7-pass erase of his computer, not just
6 one. These facts join a host of others which evidence
7 PFC Manning's interest in hiding his transgressions.

8 He used other people's user accounts and he
9 changed the default setting on his dot 22 internet
10 browser to refrain from capturing internet search
11 history.

12 But at some point, Your Honor, at some
13 point, it occurred to PFC Manning that there might be a
14 chance that his activity was being captured by audit
15 systems on the SIPRNET.

16 It was easier to obfuscate what he was
17 doing on his own machine, but not as easy on the
18 SIPRNET. And, in fact, we know that it was a concern
19 of his from his chats with Julian Assange.

20 Your Honor, on page 3, Prosecution Exhibit
21 123, Assange chats, PFC Manning said ha, I'm all over

1 the place, clearing logs, not logging at all, safe, I
2 just wanted to be certain. And this was on 6
3 March 2010, talking about clearing logs. So, again,
4 why search on Intel link for something called rainbow
5 tables on 8 March 2010.

6 PFC Manning SIPRNET computers had a local
7 user named FTP user on the account. You heard from
8 Special Agent Shaver that the FTP user, the user name
9 was a user account on the D6-A SIPRNET computers and
10 was not attributable to any particular person or user.

11 It was an account that would store files
12 without any tie to the actual user behind the keyboard.

13 It was an account where one could store
14 programs like Wget within the profile my documents and
15 not have any tie to the ultimate user behind the
16 keyboard. It's an account one could search the SIPRNET
17 and get closely held information without any tie to the
18 actual user behind the keyboard.

19 In short, Your Honor, having access to the
20 FTP user account could effectively anonymize
21 PFC Manning behind the keys of the dot 22 and dot 40

1 SIPRNET computers.

2 Fortunately for the United States, the
3 PFC Manning's attempts to gain access to the FPT user
4 account would fail despite from the assistance from
5 Julian Assange and WikiLeaks.

6 Special Agent Shaver testified that
7 Microsoft Windows has multiple ways to protect
8 passwords.

9 First, instead of storing the actual
10 password in plain text, the actual words of the
11 password, the letters and numbers, Windows converts it
12 to a unique hash value and that's called the LM hash.
13 LM hash. And it uses a complicated mathematical
14 algorithm to prevent what Special Agent Shaver called
15 bad people from obtaining passwords.

16 Second, Your Honor, Windows, Microsoft
17 Windows splits that algorithm into two pieces, storing
18 one in the computer's system file and one in the
19 computer's SAM file, system file and SAM file.

20 Finally, Windows, the last layer of
21 protection that Windows provides is that it locks down

1 these two files, the system file and SAM file. It
2 locks them down so no user except an administrator can
3 actually access the content of those files.

4 Your Honor, no, he did not have
5 administrative privileges. PFC Manning resorted to the
6 most effective method of circumventing the sort system
7 on his SIPRNET computer. He decided to bypass all of
8 Microsoft Windows, the entire operating system of
9 Windows to access the security information on the
10 computer.

11 He did that knowing the protection
12 Microsoft Windows has on the SAM and system files.

13 Special Agent Shaver testified that if the
14 user was to boot their computer using a CD that was
15 configured to run another operating system, that user
16 could navigate to the SAM file or system file on the
17 hard drive and view its contents because that's doing
18 it outside of Windows.

19 One such operating system is Linux.
20 Special Agent Shaver testified that a knowledgeable
21 person could download a copy of Linux free from the

1 internet and create a bootable version of the operating
2 system, a rescue disk that could be installed on a CD
3 and that installation program is called an ISO. ISO.

4 Special Agent Shaver testified that an ISO
5 is an image. It's an image file of the CD, a copy of a
6 CD.

7 Your Honor, Special Agent Shaver testified
8 that PFC Manning downloaded a Linux install, excuse me,
9 rescue disk ISO multiple times and specifically on 2
10 March 2010 at 17:48:51 hours, 17:48:51.

11 He burned that Linux system operating, that
12 Linux -- excuse me -- rescue disk operating system ISO
13 to a CD on his personal map.

14 Your Honor, note Prosecution Exhibit 125.
15 Prosecution Exhibit 125 is the disk utility log for
16 PFC Manning's personal Mac and specifically lines 365
17 through 382.

18 THE JUDGE: That exhibit was what?

19 MR. FEIN: 125, and it's lines 365 through
20 382. This disk utility log from the personal Mac shows
21 PFC Manning burning that Linux ISO to a disk.

1 You recall, Your Honor, that Special Agent
2 Shaver actually used the exact same Linux ISO to view
3 the folder contents that PFC Manning would have. The
4 only way Special Agent Shaver explained that one could
5 potentially obtain access to the SAM and system files
6 was to boot the computer using this Linux operating
7 system CD.

8 Now, Your Honor, you heard from Mr. Weaver,
9 one of the primary authors of AR25-2, that under 25-2
10 bypassing includes finding capabilities that elevate
11 the user's privileges.

12 He explained that traditionally bypassing
13 means someone installed or modified a system in order
14 to gain access in an unauthorized way, and this is
15 exactly what PFC Manning did or at least attempted to
16 do.

17 By equipping himself with Linux, a
18 different operating system and booting the government
19 SIPRNET D6-A computer using that CD, PFC Manning
20 attempted to bypass and did actually bypass a network
21 security system in order to obtain a security data.

1 Specifically, PFC Manning breached built-in
2 security features within Microsoft Windows, the Army's
3 approved operating system, on his D6-A computer that
4 protected the FTP user account. He wanted the account
5 log-in credentials to conceal his identity to continue
6 abusing access to SIPRNET and classified information.

7 Special Agent Shaver testified that
8 PFC Manning successfully obtained a portion of LM hash
9 value for the FTP user account from his SIPRNET
10 computer. And with that portion of the LM hash value
11 in his hand, PFC Manning wanted a way to speed up
12 cracking and decrypting the passwords for the FTP user
13 account. So he turned to his two trusty sources for
14 information, WikiLeaks and Intel link.

15 Your Honor, you'll see on page 6 of
16 Prosecution Exhibit 123, these are the Assange chats,
17 page 6. That on 8 March between 15:55 and 16:11 on 8
18 March between 15:55 and 16:11 PFC Manning chatted with
19 Julian Assange and WikiLeaks and provided a hash value
20 obtained from his SIPRNET computer SAM file.

21 With the direct assistance of Julian

1 Assange and WikiLeaks, PFC Manning attempted to reverse
2 engineer the password for FTP user.

3 Your Honor, print 130, going back to a key
4 piece of evidence in this case, is the summary created
5 by Special Agent Shaver.

6 Your Honor, when you deliberate you'll have
7 Prosecution Exhibit 130. Your Honor, with the direct
8 assistance of JA WikiLeaks, he attempted to get the
9 password.

10 Your Honor, take a look (inaudible).

11 On the top you have the extract from
12 Prosecution Exhibit 123 the Assange chat.

13 On the bottom you have the EnCase forensic
14 pole of what PFC Manning called and Special Agent
15 Shaver testified a hex dot.

16 Special Agent Shaver created this summary
17 showing PFC Manning's chatting with Julian Assange and
18 the extract from the dot 22 SAM file. You can see the
19 FTP user on the right side of the SAM file.

20 Your Honor, on the bottom right, FTP user
21 shows up in that SAM file. And then following that is

1 the hashed algorithm. The hashed algorithm, Your
2 Honor, is the 80C1049 all the way to the 351C. It's in
3 a black bold on the left side of the FTP user.

4 He also testified that he conducted a
5 process called a hex dump which converted the
6 information on the SAM file to a hash value. On the
7 left. Excuse me, Your Honor. On the left side is
8 called the hex dump.

9 The reason that's important, if you look at
10 the chats you will see that PFC Manning said at 1609 to
11 Julian Assange, not even sure if that's the hash. I
12 had to hex dump a SAM file since I don't have the
13 system file.

14 And Special Agent Shaver, using EnCase
15 forensics software, did the exact same process. As you
16 can see, Your Honor, in black at the bottom left is
17 that 80 number I just read.

18 Little difficult to see on these
19 projections, Your Honor. It's clear on the document,
20 Prosecution Exhibit 130.

21 And at the top of the chat, Your Honor,

1 PFC Manning inquires about KN hash cracking. Upon
2 hearing about the rainbow table resource, he provides
3 the partial hash values, confirming it's a SAM file
4 origins.

5 What I mean by that is that that 80C1
6 number that is on the bottom left was provided by PFC
7 Manning in his chats to receive assistance by Julian
8 Assange in cracking his SIPRNET computer, the FTP user
9 account information.

10 Your Honor, at 16:11:26 on 8 March 2010,
11 within these chats as annotated here on PE130, Julian
12 Assange responded that WikiLeaks, that is LM hash guide
13 will handle, will pass it to his LM hash guide. That's
14 on the second from the bottom from the right side.

15 Please note, Your Honor, that this chat
16 occurred by PFC Manning was off shift, and in his CHU
17 on his personal Mac, and this was at 16:11. Shift
18 change occurred every day at 2200 just shy of 30
19 minutes at 22:28.

20 PFC Manning used his SIPRNET access to
21 search for rainbow tables and Special Agent Shaver

1 testified that rainbow tables are used, are tables that
2 are used in order to find known hash values for
3 passwords if a known password in plain text converts to
4 a known hash value. Fast way to quickly determine what
5 that password is.

6 PFC Manning went to SIPRNET in order to
7 figure out if he could find a rainbow table and he
8 could not, but for six hours after he chatted with
9 Julian Assange in order to find a way to get the FTP
10 user account information, luckily for the United States
11 PFC Manning did not find what he was looking for.

12 The accused successfully breached security
13 protocols and obtained the portion of the hash value in
14 the SAM file.

15 PFC Manning knew what to do in order to
16 bypass the computer protocol and specifically, that is,
17 specifically designed to protect the password
18 information and he took deliberate steps to circumvent
19 those protections by using a Linux rescue CD.

20 He violated regulation two ways. First, by
21 booting the SIPRNET computer using a different

1 operating system, bypassed the security information
2 security mechanism, the use of user name and password
3 to gain access.

4 Special Agent Shaver, a normal user, did
5 not have access to a file. You could only gain it by
6 booting from a CD.

7 Second, by navigating the SAM file and
8 obtaining part of the hash value of the password to the
9 FTP user account, PFC Manning attempted to bypass the
10 security mechanism in place.

11 Using Julian Assange and WikiLeaks,
12 PFC Manning tried to figure out the password to another
13 local user on his SIPRNET computer, one he did not
14 normally have access to in the course of his work, so
15 he could hide in plain sight and not operate under the
16 potential fear of being caught.

17 Your Honor, I don't know if now is a good
18 time to take a recess or I can keep going.

19 THE JUDGE: It probably is. 15 minutes.

20 MR. FEIN: Yes, ma'am.

21 THE JUDGE: Court is in recess for 15

1 minutes.

2 (Court in recess.)

3 THE COURT: Court is called to order. Let
4 the record reflect all parties present when the court
5 last recessed are again present in THE court.

6 Major Fein?

7 MR. FEIN: Your Honor, the next dataset are
8 the GTMO documents, Specification 9.

9 Your Honor, the next set are the GTMO
10 documents that serve as a basis for Specification 8 and
11 9 in Charge 2 and also, Your Honor, Specification 2 of
12 Charge 3. Detainee Assessments Briefs, or DABs.

13 (Inaudible) PFC Manning researched GTMO
14 information repeatedly on Intelink. He found the DABs
15 in classified network and reviewed them.

16 He then discussed their contents with
17 Julian Assange before exporting all the records in the
18 database by using Wget, unauthorized program.

19 Even after PFC Manning stole them he
20 couldn't stop talking about them with Adrian Lamo. It
21 shows that he was looking to get the information

1 published with WikiLeaks from the beginning of his
2 deployment.

3 He was looking for politically notable
4 information that would garner as much attention as
5 Reykjavik 13 did in February 2010.

6 Using the tools provided by him in the
7 United States to analyze intelligence, PFC Manning
8 searched for information that compromised to WikiLeaks
9 when he found the GTMO DABs, detainee assessment
10 briefs.

11 Your Honor, what are DABs? DABs are a
12 recommendation to the US SOUTHCOM commander for the
13 disposition of detainees, which included the detainee's
14 threat level and intelligence value to the United
15 States.

16 The DABs contain classified information
17 pertaining to United States intelligence regarding
18 terrorists and their organizations and classified
19 information about terrorist training, TTPs, and
20 intelligence analysts of terrorist organizations.

21 Furthermore, Your Honor, the DABs

1 demonstrate the US intelligence gaps with terrorists
2 and terrorist organizations and the extent of
3 cooperation with the United States.

4 Rear Admiral David Woods testified as the
5 OCA for the DABs that compromising the DABs could cause
6 serious damage to National Security and thus they are
7 classified at the secret level.

8 THE COURT: Who was the person?

9 MR. FEIN: Rear Admiral David Woods, the
10 previous demander of JTF GTMO.

11 The DABs are housed in three locations, all
12 of which are classified.

13 Mr. Moats, Your Honor, he testified as a
14 head of the DAB branch that the DABs are stored locally
15 on the GTMO share drive on SIPRNET, on the JDIMS-I, a
16 unique system for the JTF GTMO, and also on SIPRNET on
17 Intellipedia.

18 Mr. Moats testified that the DABs are
19 stored by document ID number and a user can see the
20 document ID number by scrolling over the link for each
21 DAB on Intellipedia web page.

1 Your Honor, on 8 December 2009 PFC Manning
2 first accessed the DAB website.

3 On 5 March --

4 THE COURT: What was the date?

5 MR. FEIN: 8 December, 2009.

6 Your Honor, 5 March 2010, the Intelink logs
7 show that he attempted to download the entire database
8 but could not complete that download. Prosecution
9 Exhibit 82 shows PFC Manning's manual attempts to
10 collect the DABs.

11 Special Agent Shaver testified that PFC
12 Manning started downloading DABs using the right click
13 save method, as an ordinary user would on 5 March 2010.
14 And Special Agent Shaver testified that the right click
15 method was slow and wrought with errors.

16 THE COURT: Exhibit 82?

17 MR. FEIN: Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibit
18 82 is an extract of the Intelink log activity for 5
19 March 2010, Your Honor, line 4 of Prosecution Exhibit
20 82 shows PFC Manning's attempt to download one DAB at
21 3:22.

1 Why is this important, Your Honor?

2 Because the summary shows that PFC Manning
3 failed in this attempt because on the Intelink log data
4 there's a 000 code at the end of the actual web
5 address, 000 code. Again Prosecution Exhibit 82.

6 Special Agent Shaver testified that the 000
7 code signified that the download did not go through.
8 It was not complete.

9 A minute later PFC Manning successfully
10 downloaded the same data. Special Agent Shaver also
11 explained in a attempt that was successful a download
12 was successful if the code 200 showed up next to the
13 web address. So 000 failure; 200 complete.

14 On just the first page of Prosecution
15 Exhibit 82 there are 23 attempts to download DABs, 12
16 attempts were not successful with 000 code.

17 In order to get 11 successful downloads PFC
18 Manning spent approximately 7 minutes according to the
19 Prosecution Exhibit 82, Your Honor, in order to
20 increase the (inaudible), PFC Manning turned to an
21 unauthorized program, Wget.

1 Special Agent Shaver testified that
2 Prosecution Exhibit 157 shows PFC Manning searching for
3 information on how to make Wget run faster and that was
4 on 7 March 2010.

5 Special Agent Shaver testified that PFC
6 Manning began running Wget from dot 22 computer system
7 on 7 March 2010 the first time and PFC Manning
8 introduced that software onto his classified computer
9 in order to do that.

10 Your Honor, the unit AUP, authorized user
11 for which Captain Tripp (inaudible) will remember
12 testified prohibited soldiers from executable code
13 which specifically includes dot EXE files to a DoD
14 computer.

15 And you'll remember from the testimony
16 Special Agent Shaver, Your Honor, dot EXE files are
17 executable files.

18 Programs downloading the unauthorized Wget
19 EXE file violated AR25-2 paragraph 4-582 as detailed in
20 Specification 2 of Charge 3.

21 As Special Agent Shaver testified PFC

1 Manning, after downloading Wget dot EXE, had to program
2 Wget, how to operate Wget, did not have a graphical
3 user interface or GUI, therefore it was not as simple
4 as double clicking an icon of an installed program on
5 the D6-A computer and running it.

6 Your Honor, explained here is Prosecution
7 Exhibit 189, page 1. This is the help file Special
8 Agent Shaver testified he extracted from PFC Manning's
9 computer. When I type in Wget-H, this help file
10 displays in an MS dot prompt. Because Wget is a
11 command line tool, it has many options as displayed on
12 page 1 here.

13 PFC Manning had to research how to program
14 Wget and how to program it in order to harvest the
15 entirety of US SOUTHCOM database of DABs. PFC Manning
16 used the document ID number, the unique database
17 identifier in Wget to extract those DABs.

18 Your Honor, PFC Manning was able to
19 download the database in less than four hours once he
20 was able to get Wget running, whereas his manual
21 attempt on 5 March had been plagued with errors. PFC

1 Manning's success rate with Wget on 7 March was much
2 better.

3 Mr. Johnson testified that while PFC
4 Manning was harvesting those DABs, he also was talking
5 to Julian Assange through his chats and he recorded
6 that information.

7 Your Honor, PFC Manning and Julian Assange
8 discussed the value of the DABs, the types of
9 information in the DABs, and the status of the uploads.

10 That is in the Assange chats pages 3
11 through 5. Pages 3 through 5.

12 Two months after stealing the DABs, PFC
13 Manning bragged, telling Mr. Lamo that, oh, the JTF
14 GTMO papers Assange has those, too. PFC Manning went
15 so far as to characterize the DABs as a highlight on
16 the information he stole.

17 On 25 April 2011, WikiLeaks released
18 purported DABs on their website. Prosecution Exhibit
19 95 are the charged DABs in this case.

20 Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibit 95 showed
21 that the DABs are marked secret on the top and bottom

1 of each page. WikiLeaks published the DABs because
2 they had not been publicly released at that point and
3 the information in the DABs was not available anywhere
4 else.

5 The evidence from all the witnesses
6 indicated that the documents were closely-held.

7 As a defense's witness Colonel Retired
8 Davis testified Defense Exhibit Victor, which is a DAB,
9 was not necessarily useful to a prosecutor who needed
10 the underlying evidence but Defense Exhibit Victor was
11 an executive summary of that evidence and the
12 intelligence reporting contained little public
13 information.

14 When PFC Manning extracted the DABs to his
15 personal computer, he completed the (inaudible) of
16 those records. The DABs that were stored on the
17 classified system with only authorized personnel with a
18 need-to-know could access them. At no time, Your
19 Honor, was PFC Manning authorized to house those
20 records on his personal laptop.

21 Furthermore, Your Honor, PFC Manning

1 converted the information in the DABs when he conveyed
2 them to WikiLeaks for publication.

3 PFC Manning specifically intended for the
4 DABs to be published and WikiLeaks obliged.

5 The United States devoted significant
6 resources to protect the classified information in DABs
7 from actual compromise.

8 Mr. Lewis testified that foreign
9 intelligence services will pay for the information
10 precisely because its exclusive possession provides a
11 significant benefit to the United States.

12 The publication of the DABs completely
13 deprived the United States of the exclusive possession
14 of the use of that information, exclusive use.

15 Accordingly, Your Honor, by causing the
16 DABs to be published, PFC Manning substantially
17 interfered with the United States' ownership rights in
18 those records.

19 Using Wget he scraped an entire classified
20 website. PFC Manning then placed the exported
21 classified records on his personal computer. After

1 transferring the records to the personal computer he
2 talked about GTMO records with Julian Assange, as I
3 described before, as he delivered them to their web
4 sites online submission program.

5 Your Honor, in the end, PFC Manning felt
6 the GTMO documents were the highlight and were among
7 many records he admitted to stealing.

8 Mr. Moats testified that each DAB, as the
9 chief of the DAB branch, was the product of 80 to 90
10 hours of work by intelligence professionals, each DAB,
11 Your Honor. And Mr. Moats testified that the lowest
12 ranking person that worked on the DAB creation had the
13 grade of E4. A specialist of the United States Army in
14 2005, a specialist or E4, earned \$1,500 approximately
15 per month in base salary.

16 Assuming 40 hours per week, that works out
17 to an hourly wage of about \$9, Your Honor.

18 PFC Manning stole over 700 detainee
19 assessments. Mr. Moats testified that each DAB took
20 approximately 80 hours of work, thus 56,000 hours were
21 spent creating those DABs. Therefore, the cost to

1 create the DABs was at a minimum \$525,000 which is
2 based off 56,000 hours at the lowest grade of a
3 producer of the DABs at \$9.39 per hour.

4 Your Honor, additionally, DABs are valuable
5 to foreign intelligence services.

6 Your Honor, at this time United States
7 requests that the accused and Major Hurley relocate to
8 the witness box and I will hand Appellate Exhibit 617
9 to the Court and the Defense.

10 Your Honor, Mr. Lewis testified that the
11 foreign intelligence services in multiple countries
12 actively seek information contained in DABs and would
13 pay for DABs for the US SOUTHCOM database.

14 The foreign intelligence services seek
15 information pertaining to GTMO counterterrorism efforts
16 as detailed in Classified Reason Number 7.

17 Mr. Lewis testified that country 4 would
18 pay over \$7,000 for the records in the US SOUTHCOM
19 database and Mr. Lewis called the valuation
20 conservative as set forth in Classified Reason Number
21 8.

1 Your Honor, I'm going to transition over to
2 the two OJ documents that service the charged documents
3 for Specification 3 of Charge 2, and if I may request
4 that PFC Manning and Major Hurley stay in their current
5 position with the classified documents for the
6 beginning.

7 Your Honor, PFC Manning knowingly
8 compromised the documents belonging to United States
9 intelligence agency that makes up Specification 3 of
10 Charge 2.

11 I will generally discuss in this open
12 session the proof the United States presented for the
13 OJ information, however the United States primarily
14 refers the Court to specific -- to the top portion of
15 Appellate Exhibit 617 before I continue as that is a
16 classified legend for the remaining portion of this
17 argument.

18 THE COURT: Okay.

19 MR. FEIN: Your Honor, the United States
20 does not intend to specifically reference any of that
21 information again at this point so the United States

1 request that PFC Manning and Major Hurley relocate and
2 we could retrieve Appellate Exhibit 617.

3 Your Honor, the charged memoranda were
4 published on US official website on the dates dated in
5 print 1807 paragraphs 14 and 16. Prosecution Exhibit
6 180 paragraph 14 and 16.

7 Line 425 of Prosecution Exhibit 81, the
8 Intelink search logs, reveals that the accused searched
9 for the equity holder of these documents on a SIPRNET
10 computer on 9 March 2010. That's line 425 Prosecution
11 Exhibit 81.

12 According to the testimony of Special Agent
13 Shaver about the specific portion of the file named
14 index dot data mining on PFC Manning's dot 22 SIPRNET
15 computer, the memoranda were likely present on the dot
16 22 computer around March 2010.

17 Special Agent Shaver created Prosecution
18 Exhibit 154 to show this migration of the file names
19 during his closed session testimony.

20 THE COURT: What exhibit is that?

21 MR. FEIN: Prosecution Exhibit 154.

1 As a reminder, Your Honor, the index dot
2 dat file is a file that captures the internet history
3 of files moving between web pages and on the computer.

4 Special Agent Shaver testified that he
5 could tell that the memoranda were on the machine by
6 looking at an excerpt of the index dot dat file which
7 is a file used, as I just mentioned, to record the web
8 sites and files accessed in Microsoft Internet
9 Explorer.

10 According to Prosecution Exhibit 154, PFC
11 Manning downloaded the first memorandum on 17
12 March 2010. He saved the first memorandum and the
13 second memorandum to his desktop in the Bradley dot
14 Manning profile in his My Documents folder on the dot
15 22 computer and that was on 21 March 2010.

16 Both documents that he download were PDF
17 file names very similar to the names of the memorandum.
18 All this is reflected in Prosecution Exhibit 154.

19 Special Agent Shaver testified that most
20 memorandum were moved to the folder named Blah,
21 B-L-A-H, on 22 March 2010. Both memorandum were moved

1 to a folder named "Interesting." The name of the
2 folder itself -- was -- the name was "Interesting" on
3 that same day, Your Honor.

4 About 30 seconds later, Blah dot zip file
5 name was created in Bradley dot Manning's My Documents
6 folder.

7 According to Mr. Johnson in the volumes dot
8 txt document, that's Prosecution Exhibit 127, a file
9 named Blah dot zip was placed on the accused's personal
10 Macintosh computer on 22 March 2010.

11 According to Mr. Johnson, blah dot zip was
12 burned from a Windows machine onto a CD at 12:55 on 22
13 March and that's reflected again on Prosecution Exhibit
14 127.

15 The charge memoranda, Your Honor, were
16 properly marked classified. The memoranda also
17 contained national defense information as articulated
18 in Prosecution Exhibit 180 Alpha and 181 Alpha.
19 Paragraphs 12 through 18.

20 Specifically they both contained
21 information that concerns intelligence activities,

1 sources and methods and US foreign relations and
2 activities such that an authorized disclosure of these
3 memoranda, Your Honor, reasonably could be expected to
4 harm or cause serious harm to the national defense and
5 foreign relations of the United States.

6 Prosecution Exhibits 180 and 181 Alpha also
7 explained how the information contained in the
8 memoranda would be useful to the enemy if released and
9 show that the information in the memoranda is true, at
10 least in part.

11 The dates the memoranda were posted on
12 WikiLeaks are recorded in Prosecution Exhibit 180.
13 Prosecution Exhibit 180 paragraphs 15 and 20.

14 These paragraphs also state that these
15 memoranda were never otherwise released outside the
16 classified United States Government official channels.

17 According to Prosecution Exhibit 141, the
18 open source logs for bradass87 between 9 April 2010 and
19 13 April 12010, PFC Manning looked at several documents
20 on the open source center about the reaction to release
21 some of this information.

1 PFC Manning searched for the information on
2 the SIPRNET computer. He saved it on his dot 22
3 computer. He moved it to his personal Macintosh
4 computer and then the memoranda were posted on
5 WikiLeaks.

6 Later, PFC Manning accessed the information
7 to read about the fallout.

8 The evidence shows that the accused had
9 reason to believe that the information could be used to
10 injure the United States to the advantage of a foreign
11 nation.

12 Your Honor, the next dataset is the
13 Net-Centric Diplomacy database and the cables contained
14 within. This goes to Specifications 12 and 13 of
15 Charge 2 and also Specification 2 of Charge 3.

16 The Net-Centric Diplomacy database contain
17 decades of classified closely-held United States cables
18 related to foreign policy, including sources of
19 intelligence, Your Honor.

20 PFC Manning began by compromising a single
21 cable, Reykjavik 13 because he thought it would be of

1 interest to join Assange, WikiLeaks, based on its
2 subject matter at the time and focus on Iceland.

3 PFC Manning was correct. After PFC Manning
4 stole the cable and WikiLeaks published it, PFC Manning
5 claimed that the affect was a recall of an ambassador.

6 Having seen the result of his actions, PFC
7 Manning saw an opportunity for more notoriety.

8 Thereafter, PFC Manning set about to
9 compromise the entire NCD database, Net-Centric
10 Diplomacy database.

11 Instead of helping his unit, PFC Manning
12 took the opportunity to harvest over 250,000 Department
13 of State cables for release on WikiLeaks and to the
14 world.

15 Ms. Tann testified that a cable is an
16 official message of the Department of State and cables
17 can be sent between posts and the Department of State
18 headquarters in DC.

19 Ms. Tann testified each cable contained a
20 message resource number, which is a unique identifier.
21 Cables are used for communicating and conducting United

1 States foreign policy.

2 Accordingly, cables are often classified
3 and contain sensitive information and information that
4 must be closely guarded to enable the United States to
5 conduct its foreign policy effectively.

6 Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibits 169
7 Charlie through 177 Charlie, these are the Charlie
8 subexhibits for 169 through 177, these are the charged
9 cables, are examples of compromised cables as they
10 appear on the Net-Centric Diplomacy database. Each
11 cable and NCD contained a warning banner describing the
12 limited extent of the user's authorization to view each
13 cable.

14 Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibits 169
15 through 178, the Alpha series of all of those, 169
16 through 178, Department of State officials described
17 the contents of the stolen cables. The cables
18 contained PII, such as names and the sources of the
19 information, as well as the originator of the cable
20 itself.

21 Using names the cables identified meetings

1 with sources, human rights activists and others at risk
2 of incarceration, torture, or death in the country of
3 origin.

4 The cables also reveal sensitive
5 information regarding foreign relations, intelligence
6 sources and methods, diplomatic relations and foreign
7 policy.

8 Special Agent Bettencourt testified that
9 the purported cables posted on WikiLeaks.org span
10 decades with dates from 1966 up until 2010.

11 And Mr. Murphy testified that the charged
12 cables, that's again Prosecution Exhibit 169 through
13 177 and it's the Charlie series, contained information
14 that if compromised could cause harm or serious harm to
15 the National Security. He was a duly appointed OCA who
16 testified that the cables were either secret or
17 confidential.

18 Your Honor, why did the Department of State
19 create NCD? Ensuring the information and intelligence
20 in cables took on increased importance after
21 September 11.

1 Mr. Weiss Carter, he testified that acting
2 on the need for intelligence sharing the Department of
3 Defense providing Department of State funding to make
4 it necessary the information available on SIPRNET.

5 As a result of that funding, NCD was
6 created to share information to all users on SIPRNET.

7 Mr. Weiss testified that NCD was a system
8 that was specifically designed to provide the
9 Department of State in the SIPRNET community with
10 access to diplomatic reporting to ensure there was
11 information sharing across the Government at all levels
12 from priorities to generalities.

13 Thus, Mr. Weiss testified that NCD resided
14 only on SIPRNET and J links.

15 Captain Lim testified that he sent an
16 e-mail telling his soldiers that NCD could be used to
17 accomplish the mission in the S2 shop.

18 Captain Lim testified the 210 mission was
19 to train, mentor, advise and assist Iraqi security
20 forces in Southeast Baghdad.

21 Captain Lim testified that NCD was useful

1 for that mission in Southeast Baghdad but not for
2 Iceland, information pertaining to Iceland, South
3 America, Asia or the rest of the globe.

4 Mr. Madaras testified that he never used
5 NCD as a 35 fox because his focus was on the 210 area
6 of responsibility and that was in Baghdad.

7 PFC Manning's focus should have been on the
8 same areas of operation as a shared analyst.

9 Your Honor, instead was using NCD to
10 accomplish his mission and support his fellow soldiers
11 as an all-source intelligence analyst, PFC Manning
12 chose to harvest decades worth of SIP disk, SIPR
13 distribution cables, to gain his notoriety.

14 In his chats with Mr. Lama, PFC Manning
15 thought he was smart enough to know what's going on in
16 the world.

17 The day after returning from R and R leave
18 and on 15 February 2010 that's when he compromised
19 Reykjavik 13 and having observed the results of
20 stealing and disseminating that information, PFC
21 Manning went to work on reaping more cables.

1 From late February to early March 2010 PFC
2 Manning worked on engineering a method to steal the
3 entirety of the NCD database.

4 Your Honor, note that Mr. Carter testified
5 that a user of Net-Centric Diplomacy can only access
6 cables through the Net-Centric Diplomacy database web
7 page interface on the Department of State web page.

8 Mr. Weiss also testified that access to
9 cables on Net-Centric Diplomacy was limited because NCD
10 allows a user to view through a web browser or print a
11 single cable, save a single cable at a time.

12 When asked why there's no technical
13 restrictions put in place on NCD outside of the web
14 browser requirement, Mr. Weiss answered that it would
15 inhibit sharing of information, be administratively
16 difficult to manage, if not impossible.

17 Captain Lim also testified that an NCD user
18 can access NCD through a website, a user searched for
19 cables using key words on the NCD web page.

20 He testified it did not have an export
21 function similar to what CIDNE had, click a button and

1 export 30 days at a time. And he did not save cables.
2 He only read them for information related to his
3 mission.

4 Your Honor, Special Agent Shaver testified
5 that NCD was accessible only through a web page and the
6 only way to access a cable was to type in the
7 information in the search bar, click search, wait for
8 your return to come up on the web page then click the
9 specific cable in your web browser and once the cable
10 comes back it views in the web browser and at that
11 point you can save or print.

12 Essentially you're pointing and clicking.

13 Mr. Weiss also testified NCD did not allow
14 for batch downloading. Using NCD as a normal user, PFC
15 Manning never could have accessed let alone downloaded
16 over 250,000 cables.

17 As Captain Lim and Special Agent Shaver
18 testified, NCD only allowed a user to view one cable at
19 a time using a web browser to view a web page. This
20 was a system limitation that PFC Manning understood and
21 had to bypass to accomplish his own personal task.

1 PFC Manning knew he could not physically
2 download over a quarter million cables manually with
3 NCD's organic functionality typing in 251,000 cables
4 into a search bar, clicking on each individual one and
5 right clicking to save or print.

6 So he turned to what he knew best from his
7 experience with the GTMO DABs, Wget.

8 And, Your Honor, turning to Wget PFC
9 Manning exercised a self-help remedy in order to
10 prepare a method for his compromise, or his
11 exfiltration as PFC Manning had actually called it in
12 his personal tasking order for the GAP. His personal
13 tasking order for Department of State information to
14 create, as he said to Adrian Lamo, worldwide anarchy.

15 Your Honor, that's Prosecution Exhibit 30.
16 The Lamo chat, page 9, his goal to create worldwide
17 anarchy.

18 PFC Manning began by searching for Wget,
19 again, prosecution Exhibit 157 shows that PFC Manning
20 searched for Wget on his NIPRNET computer and Special
21 Agent Shaver testified that the search related to Wget

1 on 7 March 2010 was a search to figure out how to make
2 Wget run faster.

3 On both 7 March 2010 and 27 March 2010 PFC
4 Manning used Google to search for the executable file
5 Wget.

6 Then, Your Honor, as shown on Prosecution
7 Exhibit 157, PFC Manning downloaded Wget onto his
8 NIPRNET computer.

9 Special Agent Shaver testified that Wget
10 was in PFC Manning's users account in March of 2010 and
11 introduced again in May of 2010.

12 Your Honor, Special Agent Shaver testified
13 about Wget. Wget was an executable file that had been
14 copied and placed in the My Documents folder on PFC
15 Manning's dot 22 SIPRNET computer.

16 We know Wget was run from PFC Manning's
17 computer because of the PreFetch files, the Microsoft
18 Window files that save, say, a slice of the program
19 from memory when it runs and that slice includes the
20 exact location on the hard drive or, as Special Agent
21 Shaver called it the path, the address on the hard

1 drive for which that file ran.

2 And each time a different version or each
3 time Wget is run from a different location, a different
4 PreFetch file is created.

5 Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibit 188, 188
6 shows the PreFetch files for Wget and all of the
7 locations on PFC Manning's computer that he ran Wget.

8 Your Honor, it's clear that Wget was not
9 run by PFC Manning from a disk. So why did PFC Manning
10 have to copy Wget to his computer and run it to obtain
11 the state cables?

12 This is very simple, Your Honor.

13 The Net-Centric Diplomacy database was only
14 accessible by using a web browser, opening the web
15 page, typing in the search term and clicking the search
16 results.

17 Then the user had to navigate to the web
18 browser, decided which cable he wanted to view, click
19 that cable, wait for the cable to load in his web
20 browser and once it loaded he would have to decide
21 whether to print or save.

1 Your Honor, PFC Manning knew that. And he
2 knew the process. That process, the NCD in a D6-A
3 computer required was not fast enough or efficient
4 enough to afford him the option to harvest over 250,000
5 cables in such a short period of time.

6 In fact, Mr. Weiss testified, as I
7 mentioned earlier, that NCD database did not have a
8 function that allowed for mass downloading. So PFC
9 Manning did, as I said before what he did best, he used
10 Wget to bypass the NCD web page and go directly to the
11 web server to scrape all the Department of State cables
12 directly from the web server.

13 Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibit 187 was the
14 demonstrative aid that Special Agent Shaver testified
15 about how PFC Manning used Wget.

16 Special Agent Shaver testified that PFC
17 Manning used Wget on his computer, the bottom left, and
18 rather than going straight up to the web page click
19 search, wait for the results to come up and then save,
20 he went directly using Wget onto the web server and was
21 able to mass download all of the Department of State

1 cables from that database.

2 What that allowed, Your Honor, PFC Manning
3 to do was to circumvent, to bypass the exact mechanism
4 and place on this computer system the restrictions put
5 in place of using a web browser in order to view these
6 documents and in order to go grab them and bring them
7 down to his computer.

8 In order to accomplish this complex task of
9 running Wget, PFC Manning had to take specific steps to
10 prepare.

11 First, get and copy and paste the list of
12 the MRNs, the unique identifiers from the database from
13 the web page to itself. So he had to query, as Special
14 Agent Shaver testified, the newest cables published,
15 copy all the MRNs, copy, paste and then pasted them
16 into Excel.

17 Second, PFC Manning used Microsoft Excel to
18 automatically link together in a chain the MRNs that he
19 pasted into a Wget command line that he used the Wget
20 help file to figure out.

21 Actually, Special Agent Shaver used the

1 term catenate organic function that PFC Manning had to
2 program in order to make this process to occur quickly
3 and ultimately for 251,000 plus cables.

4 Finally, PFC Manning copied and pasted
5 those lines from the Excel spreadsheet with the Wget
6 commands into what Special Agent Shaver testified were
7 batch files. A batch file allows you to run a
8 executable program rapidly over and over again.

9 And Special Agent Shaver testified about
10 the different batch file extracts he found on the dot
11 22 computer.

12 Your Honor, PFC Manning used Wget to create
13 a functionality that did not exist.

14 Whereas Mr. Weiss testified the user
15 accessed a single cable using a web browser, PFC
16 Manning accessed over a quarter million cables by
17 introducing Wget.

18 He harvested those cables using Wget in its
19 command prompt without any action in the NCD graphical
20 user interface.

21 Prosecution Exhibit 159, Your Honor, shows

1 the staggering number of connections to the Department
2 of State cables servers and the firewall logs.

3 Prosecution Exhibit 159 shows that PFC
4 Manning's computer connected to the Department of State
5 cables firewall more than 700,000 times between 28
6 March and 9 April; 700,000 times between 28 March and 9
7 April.

8 PFC Manning spent all of his working hours
9 over 10 days harvesting cables for the transmission to
10 WikiLeaks.

11 Prosecution Exhibit 159 also shows that his
12 computer connected to the same firewall over 53,000
13 times on 3 May 2010 that's when PFC Manning went back
14 to the NCD to harvest cables from March 22 onward.

15 Mr. John testified that PFC Manning's
16 personal computer possessed a script, a program that
17 could convert information from a cable into what's
18 called Base64 format.

19 Your Honor, Base64 is an encoding layer
20 that condenses information to a simpler form to
21 transmit over the internet. The script had fuel for

1 both classification and message record number.

2 Undeterred by system restrictions and
3 limitation, PFC Manning had harvested as much
4 information as possible in the shortest amount of time
5 and thus he had to reintroduce Wget onto his computer
6 at this time.

7 So at the end of his nearly two-week
8 mission in March and April 2010, PFC Manning had
9 harvested more than 250,000 cables.

10 The evidence showed that he harvested those
11 cables and packaged them and compressed them into
12 Base64 for transmission to WikiLeaks.

13 Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibit 102 is a
14 printed version at the very top of the worksheet named
15 the backup.xlsx file that was left on the dot 22
16 computer. Backup dot.xlsx. This is a Microsoft Excel
17 file.

18 Your Honor, that printed worksheet,
19 Prosecution Exhibit 102 shows how PFC Manning cataloged
20 every single cable he harvested from NCD. The first
21 line on that worksheet, Your Honor, is 251,288.

1 Your Honor, I'll talk about that number in
2 a moment. But Prosecution Exhibit 104 that shows
3 backup dot xlsx, that was created on 3 May 2010 and
4 that's in that bloop folder we have talked about.

5 THE COURT: Created when?

6 MR. FEIN: 3 May 2010, Your Honor.

7 And that was in the bloop folder in PFC
8 Manning's My Documents.

9 Prosecution Exhibit 104 also showed that
10 files dot zip, another file was created on 4 May 2010.

11 The volumes dot txt, the volume mounting
12 data from the SIPRNET computer shows Prosecution
13 Exhibit 127, shows that, Your Honor, the volume dot txt
14 file show that a file named file dot zip was burned to
15 a CD on a SIPRNET computer that same day, 4 May 2010,
16 and ultimately moved to PFC Manning's personal Mac.

17 Your Honor, on 31 August 2011 WikiLeaks
18 published 251,287 purported Department of State cables
19 without any redactions. That number is very important.
20 I stated earlier PFC Manning left behind a file --

21 THE COURT: What was the number?

1 MR. FEIN: 251,287, Your Honor.

2 THE COURT: Okay.

3 MR. FEIN: And, Your Honor, if you
4 recollect, the backup xlsx file started with the number
5 251,288.

6 While WikiLeaks published the 251,287
7 purported cables that were dated through February 2010,
8 the purported cables WikiLeaks released did not include
9 March, April and May 2010.

10 PFC Manning had the cables from March
11 through May 2010 ready to go with his starting number
12 and that backup dot xlsx file of 251,288. And those
13 were the cables, Your Honor, located in the files dot
14 zip file that Special Agent Shaver testified.

15 This number of course, 251,288, is the next
16 number in line after 251,287. That is -- so
17 ultimately, Your Honor, PFC Manning, PFC Manning
18 reintroduced Wget to go back and harvest the remaining
19 cables starting with 251,288 because he had already
20 compromised to WikiLeaks 251,287 purported cables that
21 they released unredacted.

1 His determination and persistence had not
2 ceased. He wanted more to increase the effect in his
3 future right at this time. When extracted the records
4 from NCD to his personal computer, PFC Manning
5 completed the theft of those records.

6 The NCD records were stored on a classified
7 system where only authorized personnel with
8 need-to-know could access them. At no time was PFC
9 Manning authorized to house those records on his
10 personal computer.

11 Furthermore, PFC Manning converted the
12 information in the cables from NCD when he conveyed
13 them to the WikiLeaks for release.

14 PFC Manning specifically intended for the
15 cables to be published and WikiLeaks obliged. The
16 United States devoted significant resources to protect
17 the classified information within NCD.

18 Mr. Lewis testified that foreign
19 intelligence services will pay for information
20 precisely because its exclusive possession provides
21 significant benefit to the United States.

1 By causing the cables to be published, PFC
2 Manning substantially interfered with the United
3 States' ownership rights of exclusive possession of
4 that classified information in the records.

5 Your Honor, the United States requests that
6 the accused and Major Hurley relocate to the witness
7 stand and I will hand Appellate Exhibit 617 to both the
8 Defense and the Court.

9 Your Honor, Mr. Lewis testified that the
10 foreign intelligence services of multiple countries
11 actively seek information contained in the Net-Centric
12 Diplomacy records and would pay for records from the
13 Net Centric Diplomacy Database.

14 The foreign intelligence services seek
15 information pertaining to United States strategic plans
16 and specific geographic areas as detailed in Classified
17 Reason Number 5.

18 Mr. Lewis testified that country 3 would
19 pay well over \$1,000 for the records in the Net-Centric
20 Diplomasy database as set forth in Classified Reason
21 Number 6.

1 Mr. Lewis testified that he conducted a
2 search of the Net-Centric Diplomacy data by using
3 specific groups of key words. Based on his search he
4 received 900 responsive hits. The hits constituted 900
5 separate documents or cables.

6 Mr. Lewis testified that country 3 would
7 pay over \$2,000 per document related to the searched
8 key words.

9 Therefore, Your Honor, according to
10 Mr. Lewis, the Net-Centric Diplomasy database is worth
11 over \$1.8 million to foreign intelligence services.

12 Your Honor, the United States retrieves
13 Appellate Exhibit 617 from the Defense and the Court.

14 Now, Your Honor, what about Wget? PFC
15 Manning knew that he was not authorized to introduce
16 Wget on a Government computer.

17 Chief Ehresman testified that soldiers
18 aren't allowed to introduce programs on their computer.
19 They're allowed to run a program on a CD with
20 authorization of the both Chief Ehresman and
21 Mr. Milliman testified that if a user wanted to add

1 software, the user would have to check with
2 Mr. Milliman for approval.

3 Mr. Milliman, a D6-A contractor, testified
4 that he told the entire unit during a shift change
5 brief in the first month of deployment that he owned
6 the computers and was the proper authority.

7 Your Honor, the first month of deployment
8 for PFC Manning would have ended, the first full month
9 would have ended at the end of November, Your Honor,
10 well before March 2010.

11 Ms. Florinda White testified that Wget was
12 not authorized for D6-A computers.

13 Mr. Kits also authorized -- testified that
14 Wget was not authorized.

15 PFC Manning introduced the Wget program
16 without requesting authorization.

17 Wget was unlike any other program that was
18 openly used by soldiers in the SCIF. No one else even
19 knew what it was or what it was capable of doing that
20 came and testified here in this court martial, Your
21 Honor.

1 So when does the Army allow Wget on its
2 networks, Your Honor?

3 Well, Chief Royer testified, I'm sorry,
4 Your Honor, to correct what I just said, no one from
5 210 Mountain that was deployed in Iraq at the time had
6 ever heard of Wget including, Captain Cherepko and
7 Mr. Milliman when they were deployed.

8 You did hear, Your Honor, from Chief Royer
9 who testified that Wget is used in his op 4 capacity
10 for attacking Army networks. He uses Army Wget to
11 attack Army networks. And that's only in circumstances
12 that he's ever been authorized to introduce Wget to a
13 Government computer system. He did penetration
14 testing.

15 Chief Royer further testified that Wget can
16 be used in spear phishing and social engineering
17 attacks and both Captain Cherepko and Chief Royer said
18 Wget scrapes entire web sites and can choose any data
19 that it chooses to extracts.

20 Your Honor, Mr. Weaver testified, he was
21 one of the main authors of 25-2, he testified that

1 introducing unauthorized software violated 25-2.

2 Mr. Weaver testified that the authority to
3 add software is reserved to specified administrators.
4 PFC Manning did not have administrator privileges on
5 any of his computers.

6 Mr. Weaver testified that introducing
7 software or creating elevated privileges constituted a
8 bypass of authorized mechanisms. He testified that
9 only automated functions a user possessed were those
10 that came and were installed on the system as
11 authorized by the Army.

12 He testified that a commander could
13 authorize music and games on a computer system.
14 Mr. Weaver also testified that a user had personal
15 responsibility under 25-2.

16 Finally he testified that a user couldn't
17 add executable files or Wget specifically under AR25-2.

18 Your Honor, as Mr. Kits, expert on D6-A
19 testified that one program that soldiers did use mIRC
20 chat, had been authorized as part of a technical
21 bulletin that gave commanders the authority to use the

1 program.

2 Colonel Miller testified in regard to 210
3 Mountain's use of mIRC chat as part of the mission.

4 Colonel Miller testified that music, movies
5 and games would have (inaudible) morale and to the best
6 of his knowledge were not self-executable files.

7 There's been evidence, Your Honor, of movie
8 files to include music, movies and games from the
9 T-drive, the share drive the brigade staff used; but
10 there has been no evidence through testimony or
11 otherwise admitted that music, movies and games were
12 actually introduced to the T-drive or to any SIPRNET
13 computer by any particular soldier.

14 There has been no evidence presented that
15 movies, music or games are executable programs.

16 Additionally, there's been no evidence that
17 storage of movies, music and games were prohibited.
18 Just the introduction, the introduction is what AR25-2
19 regulates. Introduction of music, movies and games
20 onto a computer system when they're not authorized is
21 prohibited.

1 Mr. Weaver testified that there is a
2 significant distinction between introduction and
3 storage of files according to the regulation.

4 Mr. Weaver distinguished this for moving
5 files already on a network like the T-drive because
6 moving files is traditionally authorized under AR25-2.

7 While movies, movies and games and
8 authorized programs like mIRC chat were actually
9 authorized by the commander, Wget was not. As stated
10 before, was unknown to every single witness who
11 testified and was in Iraq and FOB Hammer at the time
12 PFC Manning was there.

13 Your Honor, and how PFC Manning used Wget
14 informs the knowledge that he knew it was unauthorized.
15 He used Wget in secret. He never asked for permission
16 to use Wget.

17 And Chief Royer testified that someone
18 could not even see Wget from five feet away. It's a
19 command prompt run program.

20 Special Agent Shaver testified that Wget
21 could be run in the background.

1 Chief Royer testified that unlike mIRC chat
2 that has a window with chat rooms on it, no one who has
3 never seen Wget before would know what it is.

4 And Sergeant Sadtler, Your Honor, he
5 testified that PFC Manning had the habit of locking his
6 screen to hide what he's doing on his computer even
7 when he was still sitting at his computer if another
8 individual walked up.

9 Your Honor, the United States is not
10 arguing that PFC Manning was prohibited from accessing
11 the NCD database itself or from downloading individual
12 cables through the NCD database interface.

13 However, PFC Manning was only authorized to
14 do so through using a web browser installed on his D6-A
15 SIPRNET computer because that is the tool, the program
16 the United States Army gave him to accomplish that
17 mission and he was not authorized to install or copy
18 any other programs onto his computer.

19 He copied Wget onto his computer for one
20 purpose and one purpose only, and that was to access
21 the NCD web server directly and scrape it for all the

1 Department of State cables.

2 Your Honor, the next set of specifications
3 and the dataset is the Farah investigation. This is
4 Specification 10 of Charge 2. Specification 10 of
5 Charge 2.

6 Your Honor, earlier you heard that PFC
7 Manning began helping WikiLeaks in late 2009 when he
8 compromised the video BE22PAX.wmv, the Gharani
9 airstrike video. The video, the military operation in
10 the town of Gharani and the Farah province of
11 Afghanistan. That military operation resulted in US
12 CENTCOM conducting a formal investigation into the
13 circumstances surrounding the civilian casualty
14 incident. The United States stored that investigation
15 in a folder named Farah on the (inaudible) that is only
16 available on SIPRNET. BE22PAX.zip and wmv was located
17 in the video subfolder.

18 Your Honor, four months after compromising
19 BE22PAX.zip and the video within it, PFC Manning
20 returned to the Farah folder located on the CENTCOM SJ
21 web page to download and compromise the remaining

1 documents related to that investigation.

2 Special Agent Shaver testified that on 10
3 April 2010 PFC Manning visited Farah folder. Within 2
4 hours PFC Manning had downloaded more than 330
5 investigative files from the Farah folder onto his
6 SIPRNET computer.

7 Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibit 129, 129 is
8 an excerpt of the CENTCOM SharePoint logs showing when
9 PFC Manning downloaded the documents from the CENTCOM
10 website.

11 Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibit 128 is a
12 summary of the portion of index dot dat file on PFC
13 Manning's SIPRNET computer showing many of the
14 documents PFC Manning downloaded from the CENTCOM
15 website on the SIPRNET computer.

16 As I explained earlier, Your Honor,
17 Prosecution Exhibit 128 shows PFC Manning's computer
18 connecting to the SharePoint server and the Prosecution
19 Exhibit 129 are the SharePoint logs showing PFC Manning
20 or showing files being downloaded.

21 As noted earlier, Special Agent Shaver

1 testified that PFC Manning did not take the video
2 titled BE22PAX.zip and wmv or any other zip file on 10
3 April 2010. No files were downloaded that day from the
4 CENTCOM website. Why not?

5 United States argue it's obvious. He had
6 already done it, taken the videos. Why did he wait
7 until 10 April 2010 to download and compromise the
8 documents related to military operation? Why decide in
9 10 April 2010?

10 Your Honor, it's during this time from
11 starting 5 April 2010 to be exact that WikiLeaks
12 released Apache video between 7 and 10 April 2010 and
13 the annotated and Prosecution Exhibit 81 the Intelink
14 search logs, specifically lines 628 through 640, 628
15 through 640. PFC Manning searched Intelink for
16 WikiLeaks 11 times and 'Collateral Murder' twice.

17 He was monitoring and reveling in the
18 reaction to the Apache video.

19 Your Honor, PFC Manning saw the rippling
20 effects caused by the release of the Apache video less
21 than a week earlier and he craved the same effect of

1 that Gharani military operation especially considering
2 WikiLeaks had the video since before Christmas and
3 hadn't released it yet. PFC Manning knew the charge
4 documents for Specification 10 were classified. These
5 documents were probably marked secret.

6 Of the 10 charged documents consisting of
7 141 pages, 90 pages are marked secret at the top and
8 bottom and a total of 504 classification markings,
9 including the paragraph markings, appear in total.

10 Your Honor, the documents were located on
11 the SIPRNET on the CENTCOM SharePoint page as explained
12 earlier with respect to the compromise of the video.
13 Each of these web pages had a secret banner across the
14 top that said "secret" multiple times. When the user
15 scrolled down in the video, each page had that same
16 secret banner.

17 Your Honor, Mr. Hall, former intelligence
18 analyst and expert testified that intelligence analysts
19 are trained to handle classified documents according to
20 their classification markings and that only an OCA is
21 in a position to say otherwise.

1 Further, many former unit colleagues of PFC
2 Manning testified that their trained practice is to
3 treat information on SIPRNET as classified.

4 Your Honor, even PFC Manning's two
5 non-disclosure agreements that he signed specifically
6 state that if he's uncertain about the classification
7 and status he is required to assume it's classified
8 unless he's told otherwise by competent authority.

9 The charge documents for Specification 10
10 relate to the national defense of the United States,
11 Lieutenant Commander Hoskins and Mr. Neri, excuse me,
12 Lieutenant Colonel Retired Neri, both testified that
13 the charged documents contained the type of information
14 which can cause serious harm in national security and
15 thus should be secret.

16 And then Rear Admiral Harward, the deputy
17 commander of US CENTCOM, and an OCA, testified that all
18 the documents were properly classified at secret level.

19 Your Honor, multiple witnesses testified
20 that the charged documents contained TTP, troop
21 movements, close air support, troops in combat,

1 graphics showing troop movements, operational
2 activities, weapon systems and code words.

3 And finally, Your Honor, the United States
4 Government has never made those documents of the Farah
5 investigation, the classified documents, available to
6 the public.

7 Your Honor, the Global Address List
8 Specification 16 of Charge 2, also Specification 3
9 Charge 3, excuse me, Your Honor, Specification 4 Charge
10 3. Your Honor, there's no coincidence that on the same
11 day of having PFC Manning's SIPRNET connection
12 severed --

13 THE COURT: Which specification did you say
14 is Charge 3?

15 MR. FEIN: Specification 4, Your Honor.

16 Your Honor, it's no coincidence on the same
17 day having the SIPRNET connection severed by being
18 removed from the SCIF that WikiLeaks set out a net call
19 for as many dot mil e-mail addresses.

20 7 May 2010 we would like a list of as many
21 dot mil e-mail addresses as possible. Please contact

1 the editor@wikileaks.org or submit.

2 Your Honor, PFC Manning saw this 2008 and
3 jumped at the opportunity to continue disclosing
4 closely-held information to WikiLeaks. Especially
5 after being removed from the area with readily
6 available SIPRNET.

7 Special Agent Williamson testified that
8 shortly after the 2008 was published on 7 May, PFC
9 Manning searched for macros to extract the GAP.

10 What does that mean, Your Honor? He
11 searched for a process in order to extract the GAP.
12 And by 13 May, PFC Manning had extracted Global Address
13 List and deleted the stolen files.

14 Specification 4 of Charge 3 accounts for
15 this criminal misuse of the NIPRNET and Global Address
16 List information system and Specification 16 is the
17 theft of the Global Address List for his own personal
18 use.

19 Your Honor, Specification 4 of Charge 3
20 charges PFC Manning with violating AR25-2 paragraph
21 4-5A3 by using an information system in a manner other

1 than its intended purpose.

2 According to AR25-2 information systems
3 includes computers as well as set of information
4 resources like the Microsoft exchange Global Address
5 List.

6 Chief Nixon testified that the GAL is a US
7 Government product which populates information at the
8 organizational level ultimately listing every person,
9 entity, and machine within a given domain, and in this
10 case it's Iraq. It is the interface Outlook users use
11 as a directory for e-mails and other contact
12 information.

13 The GAL provides each user's e-mail
14 address.

15 The first line, Your Honor, John dot, we'll
16 say, Doe at Iraq at CENTCOM dot mil.

17 It also provides their user names for their
18 accounts on NIPRNET. John dot Doe, Tasha dot Doe, Sean
19 dot Doe. Their user names to log onto NIPRNET.

20 You also heard testimony from Chief Royer
21 that the Department of Defense tries to use the same

1 user names in all e-mails addresses in order to
2 deconflict potential over-redundancies.

3 Also, Your Honor, individuals' full names,
4 including their unit, office and duty description is
5 included in this information. Christopher specialist
6 1AAB, an S2 analyst.

7 Prosecution Exhibits 47, 48, 147, there's
8 going to be a few exhibits here, Your Honor.

9 Prosecution Exhibits 47 and 48 are the
10 entire listing of the 74,000 entries. One for the
11 names and one for the e-mail addresses. That's PE47
12 and 48.

13 Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibits 147 and
14 148 are the 20-page extracts the witnesses referenced
15 on the stand. A are the unredacted forms and the
16 Bravos are the ones you're looking at right here, Your
17 Honor.

18 This information is the entire compromised
19 Global Address List as PFC Manning had access and the
20 extracts used by those witnesses that I just explained.

21 The first portion of an e-mail address is

1 that individual's user name and as I mentioned a moment
2 ago, Your Honor, this portion not only does it have
3 their name, but their rank, their office and their,
4 potentially their location of where they're working.

5 Your Honor, according to Chief Royer, in
6 many cases the user names continue for that
7 deconfliction. Knowing user names makes the listed
8 individuals more vulnerable to attack. The information
9 provides adversaries a likely list of longstanding
10 e-mails and (inaudible).

11 Moreover, Your Honor, in the hands of an
12 adversary intelligence organization, the list is a
13 virtual directory of persons with security clearances
14 as you just saw and intel analysts or sensitivity
15 positions as well as potential map for the unit
16 structure.

17 In short, Your Honor, the GAL becomes a
18 phone book for exploitation. The release of this list
19 would render the information and potentially the
20 physical security for everyone on the list vulnerable
21 to exploitation and ultimately compromise the

1 effectiveness of the countless missions that those
2 soldiers are working.

3 Chief Royer testified that the GAL would be
4 one of the top records that he would seek as op 4.

5 So according to Sergeant Bigelow, PFC
6 Manning left the S2 shop on 8 May 2010 and started
7 working in the supply room around 9 May 2010.

8 PFC Manning was upset at the move but most
9 thought it was entirely because of the fight he had
10 with his fellow soldier, but he was actually upset
11 because he lost his all-access pass to SIPRNET and his
12 security clearance which he needed to keep in order to
13 continue compromising classified information.

14 PFC Manning, however, quickly found
15 something else. Something that he could do to maintain
16 relevance in the fast moving disclosure world and that
17 was based off the WikiLeaks 2008. PFC Manning quickly
18 set about refocusing his energies on NIPRNET and
19 created a tester for himself in the process.

20 This is Prosecution Exhibit 122, Your
21 Honor. A recovered TASK for PFC Manning to exfiltrate

1 the Global Address List. This TASK mentioned
2 exfiltrate of CIDNE records under purpose. Also
3 organized and (inaudible) PFC Manning creating a TASK
4 to steal the information of CIDNE and for the Global
5 Address List. Acquire and exfiltrate the GAL from the
6 US forces Iraq, Microsoft Outlook, SharePoint exchange
7 server.

8 Very precise, Your Honor, e-mail the
9 classifies messages from USFI CIDNE event log method,
10 acquire the documents and exact target. Prosecution
11 Exhibit 122.

12 Your Honor, Special Agent Williamson,
13 forensic examiner testified that he found Google search
14 page results related to the computer programming to
15 extract that information from a GAL.

16 The first search was for, quote, Global
17 Address List Macro Outlook, end quote, and in return
18 what has been marked as Prosecution Exhibit 144.

19 THE COURT: What was the name of the
20 search?

21 MR. FEIN: Your Honor, Global Address List

1 Macro Outlook, which is also written down in the search
2 field on Prosecution Exhibit 144.

3 What's clear from looking at the Google
4 search results, Your Honor, is that that search term
5 brings up potential pages in order to figure out how to
6 extract and exfiltrate that information from Outlook
7 because Outlook did not have a function to allow for
8 the e-mails to be pulled out in batch.

9 The second search was for, quote, VBA,
10 Outlook write text file, VBA, Outlook write text file.

11

12 And that returned the search results that
13 are at Prosecution Exhibit 145, PE145.

14 Your Honor, VBA stands for, as Special
15 Agent Williamson said, Visual Basic. Visual Basic is a
16 program within Microsoft Outlook, or excuse me,
17 Microsoft Office that allows simple programming in
18 order to have the Microsoft Office Tools programs
19 complete automated tasks. And that was another process
20 that PFC Manning researched in order to figure out how,
21 how to get around the limitation within Outlook of

1 downloading and exfiltrating all the e-mails.

2 Special Agent Williamson also testified
3 that Visual Basic and macros are the ways you could do
4 that.

5 Outlook can only save e-mails by user
6 clicking on "save as" and selecting dot txt file type.

7 Outlook does not have a function to mass
8 export.

9 Special Agent Williamson also recovered two
10 different types of files related to the Global Address
11 List from Staff Sergeant Bigelow's computers. Those
12 two files, Your Honor, are what are in, from his
13 testimony, Prosecution Exhibits 47 and 48. The names
14 and then the e-mails files.

15 Although Staff Sergeant Bigelow and Special
16 Agent Williamson testified that this is ample evidence
17 that PFC Manning used that account at the same time on
18 gmail, financial records, reach out to Adrian Lamo and
19 search for WikiLeaks and Julian Assange on the
20 internet.

21 According to Mr. Johnson, there's evidence

1 that PFC Manning moved these files, the names and the
2 e-mail text files, to his personal computer. As you
3 heard from Mr. Johnson he found thousands of exchange
4 formatted names and e-mails in unallocated space.

5 This act was precisely the same process PFC
6 Manning followed each time he found a disclosed
7 classified material. He would use the US Government
8 system to manipulate the data, download the information
9 from the Government system, transfer the data to his
10 personal computer either by CD or in this case because
11 it's unclassified through e-mail and then package it,
12 transmit the information to WikiLeaks and then delete
13 the information.

14 The information doesn't appear, Your Honor,
15 in the unallocated space of the computer unless PFC
16 Manning took the additional step of deleting it out of
17 his recycle bin or trying to permanently delete it off
18 of the computer.

19 He took all the same steps with the Global
20 Address List information as he had previously done with
21 each disclosure. Each of these circumstantial pieces

1 of evidence corroborates the manner, timeline and
2 impetus behind his actions and proven forensically.

3 You recall that Chief Royer and Nixon
4 testified that the purposes of the US forces Iraq
5 Global Address List was to facilitate official
6 communications.

7 Nixon testified that user granted
8 permissions to search for e-mail addresses but not mass
9 download them. Microsoft Outlook or NIPRNET computers
10 had a function -- did not have a function to export or
11 download the e-mails (inaudible) even in Iraq who had
12 an e-mail account used and was listed in the Global
13 Address List directory.

14 Your Honor, we know that PFC Manning's
15 conduct violated AR25-2 by using an information system
16 in a manner other than intended purpose.

17 PFC Manning downloaded the U.S. Government
18 information from an Army information system to his user
19 account but to another user's account that belonged to
20 a supervisor, Sergeant Bigelow.

21 PFC Manning did not have permission from

1 his supervisor to do this, nor did he have permission
2 from the Army or individuals whose private information
3 he took.

4 He had no additional or legitimate reason
5 for this action.

6 PFC Manning took the information out of the
7 safe confines that protected the United States
8 Government information system and the network for his
9 own personal desires by e-mailing through his either
10 Gmail account or burning it onto a CD.

11 The Global Address List information
12 ultimately ended up on his unsecure personal computer
13 on the internet that his -- well on his personal
14 computer connected to the internet.

15 PFC Manning exposed the sensitive personal
16 information of his brothers and sisters in arms,
17 including all the civilians deployed in Iraq within the
18 74,000 names.

19 Exposed all that information to foreign
20 intelligence collection as well as spear phishers and
21 other electronic invasion schemes.

1 PFC Manning told each Adrian Lamo that
2 after adversaries used spear phishing, he used the word
3 spear phishing, to attack the United States.

4 PFC Manning noted that the adversaries are
5 not successful typically because they can't penetrate
6 the air gap.

7 Instead, it was PFC Manning, Your Honor,
8 who penetrated the air gap, meaning the connection
9 between the US Government systems and the rest of the
10 internet. PFC Manning's actions likely exposed the
11 system relied upon by these service members to
12 electronic intrusion as he knew this from his IA
13 training.

14 Chief Nixon and Chief Royer testified there
15 would be no reason, Your Honor, no reason to download
16 the Global Address List because without access to an
17 exchange server a person couldn't even send an official
18 e-mail. When you have access to the exchange server,
19 you automatically have access to the Global Address
20 List.

21 The proper (inaudible) is the information

1 contained the Global Address List. The value of the
2 information established is by the independent pieces of
3 evidence.

4 Your Honor, the issue here is whether the
5 74,000 e-mails were more than the statutory limit for
6 the 641 offense.

7 Chief Nixon testified that dozens of
8 service members worked on creating and entering the
9 information for each user that goes onto the Global
10 Address List.

11 Every time a new user soldier entered that
12 information, Chief Royer testified they would take at
13 least 10 minutes to create a new account in the Global
14 Address List. For 74,000 e-mails that is 740,000
15 minutes, or over 12,000 hours or over 51 days straight
16 with no sleep for one soldier to create every Global
17 Address List entry that PFC Manning stole.

18 Chief Royer testified that soldiers ranking
19 from Specialist to Chief Warrant Officer 4 created
20 Global Address List entries.

21 In 2010 a soldier at the rank or grade of

1 E4 rank the Specialist earned approximately \$1,800 per
2 month, which also is approximately \$11 per hour
3 assuming a 40-hour work week.

4 At a rate of \$11 per hour for 1233 hours it
5 would cost over \$145,000 to create the entries for the
6 GAL. Thus, the salary for a Specialist to create each
7 e-mail address and associated information that PFC
8 Manning took when he stole the GAL would well exceed
9 \$1,000.

10 Your Honor, overall the portion of the GAL
11 that PFC Manning took, he stole, consists of 74,000
12 users. It is clear that -- excuse me, Your Honor,
13 Mr. Lewis testified that the foreign intelligence
14 services of multiple countries actively seek
15 information in the GAL and would pay for the GAL.

16 Your Honor, for the last time, the United
17 States requests that the Defense relocate to the
18 witness box and I'm going to hand Appellate Exhibit 617
19 to the court and the accused.

20 Your Honor, the foreign intelligence
21 services seek information pertaining to specific

1 individuals and associated organization information as
2 detailed and Classified Reason Number 9.

3 Mr. Lewis emphasized that a block of
4 information is more valuable to foreign intelligence
5 services. The GAL reveals unit strength and can be
6 associated with other intelligence to increase
7 adversarial understanding of the United States TTPs
8 because the GAL states duty positions and units.

9 Thus, Mr. Lewis testified that country 5
10 and their intelligence services would pay over \$3,000
11 on the low end for the records in the GAL as set forth
12 in Classified Reason Number 10.

13 Your Honor, the United States is -- or I
14 will retrieve Appellate Exhibit 617 from the Court and
15 the witness.

16 In this case, Your Honor, as PFC Manning
17 took the deliberate actions I previously described to
18 target, extract, and transfer and then hide US
19 Government information, all for the unofficial purpose
20 of transferring this information to WikiLeaks because
21 they asked for it, in doing so, Your Honor, you heard

1 testimony that PFC Manning deliberately placed all US
2 Government employees and soldiers in Iraq at personal
3 risk by removing their PI from the NIPRNET protected
4 system. This PI, by Army regulation 25-2, is sensitive
5 information that shouldn't be placed on a personal
6 computer.

7 When PFC Manning extracted the GAL to his
8 personal computer he completed his theft of those
9 records. The GAL was stored on an unclassified system
10 where only unauthorized or where only authorized
11 personnel could access them.

12 At no time was PFC Manning authorized to
13 house the GAL on his personal laptop.

14 Mr. Lewis testified that foreign
15 intelligence services will pay for this type of
16 information precisely because its exclusive possession
17 by the United States Government, provides a significant
18 benefit.

19 Your Honor, at this time the United States
20 recommends we go in one final recess and then finish
21 the closing.

1 THE COURT: All right.

2 MR. FEIN: Or keep going, Your Honor.

3 THE COURT: No. This is a good time to
4 take a 15-minute recess.

5 I'd like to see counsel in my chambers to
6 talk about the way ahead during that recess.

7 (Court in recess.)

8 THE COURT: Court is called to order.

9 Let the record reflected all parties
10 present when the court last recessed are present.

11 Before we proceed with the remainder of the
12 Prosecution's closing argument, counsel and I met in
13 chambers over the recess to look at the way ahead.

14 First of all, we discussed the Court
15 granted three amendments to the charge sheet and the
16 Government has not made those yet so the Government
17 will do that in recess, Xerox copy of the original
18 charge sheet that has the charges at arraignment.

19 And secondly, in light of the time, what we
20 are going to do is finish the Government's closing
21 argument today.

1 We'll start at 0930 with the defense
2 closing argument and rebuttal by the Government if they
3 have any.

4 MR. FEIN: Your Honor, Specification 1 of
5 Charge 2. In total PFC Manning compromised more than
6 700,000 classified documents to WikiLeaks and
7 unquestionably knew that anything he compromised to
8 WikiLeaks would be released to the public on the
9 Internet. And how did he know that, Your Honor?

10 THE COURT: Are you doing Specification 1,
11 Charge 1 or Specification 1 of Charge 2?

12 MR. FEIN: Your Honor, Specification 1 of
13 Charge 2.

14 How do we know that, that PFC Manning
15 unquestionably knew that anything he compromised to
16 WikiLeaks would be released to the public on the
17 internet?

18 First, he repeatedly reviewed intelligence
19 reports discussing the WikiLeaks' mission and its
20 operations no later than 1 December 2009. This
21 included the ACIC report, IRR and C3 document, which

1 all of them explicitly told PFC Manning anything that
2 he provided to WikiLeaks would be released to the
3 public.

4 Second, his chat to Julian Assange. While
5 committing his reckless disclosures, PFC Manning
6 contemporaneously engaged in online chats with Julian
7 Assange and urged him to release the documents
8 previously provided by him to the ones that were not
9 released.

10 Third, his constant research of the world
11 reaction when the documents he compromised to WikiLeaks
12 were released to the public.

13 And, fourth, his chats with Julian Assange
14 where he released his criminal acts. Your Honor, PFC
15 Manning chose to compromise the documents to WikiLeaks
16 because he knew that WikiLeaks would release them on
17 the internet.

18 So what did PFC Manning cause to be
19 published by the internet?

20 The Court took judicial notice of the
21 following facts: On 15 March 2010 WikiLeaks released

1 the ACIC report, an actual intel report measuring the
2 threat caused by WikiLeaks.

3 On 5 April 2010 WikiLeaks released the
4 Apache video of a military operation.

5 On 25 July 2010 WikiLeaks released more
6 than 75,000 SIGACTS from the CIDNE-A database.

7 THE COURT: What was the date of that?

8 MR. FEIN: 25 July 2010, Your Honor.

9 Contained actual tactical reports of
10 significant events occurring in Afghanistan.

11 On 22 October 2010 WikiLeaks released more
12 than 390,000 SIGACTS from the CIDNE-I database and
13 those containing actual tactical reports of significant
14 events occurring in Iraq.

15 Your Honor, 27 and 28 November 2010
16 WikiLeaks began releasing the Department of State
17 cables and that is what the court took judicial notice
18 of and Special Agent Bettencourt testified on 21
19 August 2011 all the purported cables were released by
20 WikiLeaks and those were actual reports showing how we
21 conduct foreign relations.

1 Your Honor, 25 April 2011 WikiLeaks
2 receives more than 700 GTMO DABs, detainee assessment
3 briefs, that were actual reports containing
4 intelligence relating to the particular detainees.
5 Each of these records, were produced by United States
6 Government, stored on the SIPRNET, and were integral to
7 the war against terrorism or US foreign policy and
8 diplomacy.

9 Witnesses testified that the ACIC report,
10 Apache video, SIGACT database, NCD database, SOUTHCOM
11 database, all contained actual and true information
12 thus intelligence. This intelligence was accessible to
13 PFC Manning and PFC Manning made this intelligence
14 accessible to the world on the internet through
15 WikiLeaks.

16 Your Honor, you have heard evidence that
17 PFC Manning knew he was not authorized to transmit
18 these classified documents to WikiLeaks and WikiLeaks
19 was not authorized to receive classified information.
20 It did not meet the three criteria that PFC Manning
21 knew too well.

1 You have also heard, well -- an
2 overwhelming amount of evidence that PFC Manning knew
3 that the enemy uses the internet to gather
4 intelligence.

5 Specification 1 of Charge 2 requires the
6 United States to prove that PFC Manning acted wantonly
7 when he caused this intelligence to be published on the
8 internet, whether all the (inaudible) circumstances his
9 conduct was that he, that a type of heedless nature
10 that made it actually or eminently dangerous to others.

11 The evidence without question is
12 overwhelming to prove, at the very least is utter
13 recklessness.

14 PFC Manning compromised more than 700,000
15 classified documents during the 7-month deployment.
16 That's 100,000 documents per month, 3,300 documents per
17 day, 138 documents per hour and more than two documents
18 every minute.

19 Your Honor, there is absolutely no way he
20 even knew what he was giving to WikiLeaks as far as the
21 entire large databases. Instead, he learned the exact

1 details of what he compromised the same time as the
2 public and the enemy.

3 The individual details, PFC Manning,
4 without question, understood this risk. He told Adrian
5 Lamo that Hillary Clinton and several thousand
6 diplomats around the world were going to have a heart
7 attack when they woke up one morning and found an
8 entire repository of classified foreign policies
9 available in searchable format to the public. He
10 recognized that and even acknowledged that his actions
11 will affect everybody on earth in the same chats.

12 Lastly, Your Honor, the United States
13 proved that PFC Manning's misconduct was prejudicial to
14 good order discipline and service for all of the
15 Specification of Charge 2.

16 Colonel Miller, Colonel Miller testified
17 that the last thing he expected was an internal
18 security breach from one of his own, an insider threat
19 from within his ranks.

20 According to Colonel Miller, when he
21 briefed the staff about PFC Manning's actions, a

1 funeral-like atmosphere fell over the crowd. They were
2 angry, sad, grieved and frustrated all at the same
3 time.

4 Colonel Miller testified that before the
5 scope of PFC Manning's misconduct was revealed, the
6 unit morale was at an all-time high. As they had just
7 completed their mission requirements, everything was
8 going well with the Iraqi security forces and they were
9 beginning to do draw-down in order to redeploy to
10 Ft. Drum.

11 Soldiers that had been on numerous prior
12 deployments within, as he testified, the most deployed
13 brigade in the United States Army, were finally seeing
14 the fruits of their labors over the past 10 years come
15 to fruition.

16 And then, PFC Manning's covert actions came
17 to light. His misconduct completely shook the entire
18 brigade, according to Colonel Miller. Colonel Miller
19 testified that the morale took a hit. It took a hit as
20 a result of PFC Manning's actions. The unit
21 collectively felt it was a blemish on its otherwise

1 stellar record.

2 PFC Manning's recklessness negatively
3 impacted the trusted formation. Colonel Miller
4 testified that trusted information is the foundation
5 for everything we do in the military. Every soldier
6 has to know that every other soldier is doing their job
7 and they have to trust each other in order to stay
8 focused on their mission. Every soldier has to rely on
9 each other and know that they have each other's backs.

10 Those are the words of Colonel Miller, Your
11 Honor.

12 If there's a distraction and the soldier
13 has to look to his left and right when he's supposed to
14 be looking in front of him, that his eyes are off his
15 job and the foundation of the military starts to
16 crumble.

17 Your Honor, according to Colonel Miller,
18 the US Army relies on the trust of (inaudible) PFC
19 Manning's actions caused the morale of the unit to take
20 a hit to create the (inaudible). Thus, Your Honor, it
21 was prejudice (inaudible) and service discrediting.

1 Your Honor, 104 aiding the enemy by giving
2 intelligence. Your Honor, PFC Manning deliberately
3 transmitted the Apache video, certain Department of
4 State cables information, and the CIDNE-A SIGACTS to
5 WikiLeaks. He did this with the knowledge and intent
6 that it would be released to the world and he did this
7 knowing that the enemy would retrieve this valuable
8 information from WikiLeaks.

9 Your Honor, for Article 104 purposes, who
10 are the enemies of the United States. You heard
11 evidence from multiple sources, multiple witnesses
12 regarding enemies of the United States and specifically
13 al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula.

14 One of those sources of evidence is your
15 ruling on judicial notice. You took judicial notice
16 that facts establishing (inaudible) and Adam Gadahn are
17 members off al-Qaeda and enemies of the United States,
18 al-Qaeda and Arabian Peninsula are also an enemy of the
19 United States.

20 Your Honor, you also have Prosecution
21 Exhibit 153. That is a stipulation of fact for Osama

1 bin Laden.

2 And you have Prosecution Exhibit 182. The
3 stipulation of fact for Adam Gadahn. You have those
4 for your reference, Your Honor.

5 Commander Aboul-Enein, through a
6 stipulation of expected testimony, explained the
7 historical background of al-Qaeda and the Arabian
8 Peninsula and how they operate as an enemy of the
9 United States. None of these facts for dispute.

10 What's specifically contested, but not in
11 dispute, is PFC Manning's knowledge.

12 PFC Manning had actual knowledge that these
13 enemies, al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda Arabian Peninsula used
14 WikiLeaks to gather intelligence on the United States.
15 And, therefore, by giving intelligence to WikiLeaks he
16 was giving intelligence to the enemy.

17 PFC Manning had the general evil intent
18 necessary to aid the enemy and evidence shows that he
19 acted voluntarily and deliberately with his
20 disclosures.

21 The United States proved beyond a

1 reasonable doubt that PFC Manning's voluntary and
2 deliberate actions to disclose over 700,000 documents
3 to the world and public through WikiLeaks were in the
4 actual hands of the enemy and PFC Manning knew this
5 would occur when he released that information.

6 The evidence showed that PFC Manning was a
7 trained intelligence analyst. His daily work product
8 as an intelligence analyst in Garrison and in theater
9 established his knowledge of the enemy threat. His
10 research of intelligence reports related to WikiLeaks
11 warned him repeatedly of the enemy's use of WikiLeaks.

12 In his own statements he established that
13 he knew, he knew through his own words that the
14 information would be made available to the world
15 without alteration.

16 First, Your Honor, PFC Manning's military
17 training. He was an all-source intelligence analyst at
18 35 fox. No other MOS in the entire United States Army
19 receive such detail level of instruction on the enemies
20 of the United States, what they're capable of, and why
21 we keep classified information from their possession.

1 Your Honor, what did PFC Manning learn at
2 AIT about the need to safeguard classified and
3 sensitive information? The dangers of putting such
4 information on the internet and the enemy's use of the
5 internet. He learned the lesson of INFOSEC.
6 Prosecution Exhibit 52. The PowerPoint slide show he
7 received. The lessons on the identity of terrorist
8 groups including al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. Lessons
9 on the enemy attempting to discover how and when the US
10 is conducting military operations.

11 Slide 72 of PE52. 72 of 52.

12 Lessons not to discuss operational
13 activities on the internet or on e-mail and that
14 soldiers should always assume, always assume, that an
15 adversary is reading posted material on the internet.

16 Lessons that the enemy used the internet.

17 Lessons that focused on the enemy piecing
18 together information on the internet to use against the
19 United States includes, PII, unit identification and
20 unit location information.

21 And, finally, lessons focused on ensuring

1 information posted on the internet has no significant
2 value to the adversaries because soldiers have to
3 always assume, he was taught, always assume that that
4 adversary is reading their material on the internet.

5 Your Honor, PFC Manning knew and understood
6 the different types of recruiting utilized by terrorist
7 organizations, in particular al-Qaeda. And the number
8 of terrorist web sites have jumped from less than 100
9 to as many as 4,000 over the past 10 years.

10 He also learned about non-disclosure
11 agreements. In 2008 he signed two of them, two
12 non-disclosure agreements accepting responsibility for
13 having knowledge of the potential effects of
14 unauthorized disclosure of classified information. He
15 declared his understanding of being reposed trust and
16 confidence to protect our nation's secrets.

17 Based on his training and assigning of two
18 non-disclosure agreements, PFC Manning had actual
19 knowledge that terrorist organizations would use
20 WikiLeaks as a source for their intelligence
21 collection.

1 When disclosing all the classified
2 information from the SIPRNET, PFC Manning understood
3 the consequences of his actions and knew, without any
4 doubt, Your Honor, that the information he compromised
5 would be in the hands of the enemy.

6 Prosecution Exhibit 25 is a copy of the
7 OPSEC PowerPoint brief he created and taught others.

8 Prosecution Exhibit 25, his own words, Your
9 Honor.

10 And, Your Honor, the fact that Osama bin
11 Laden asked for the disclosed information and received
12 it proves that PFC Manning was correct when he taught
13 in Prosecution Exhibit 25 that adversaries, including
14 foreign governments, terrorists and activists and
15 hackers, that's who they are, that the common OPSEC
16 leaks include leaks on the internet and that disclosure
17 of the information on the internet must be avoided
18 because one must use common sense because there are
19 many enemies and it's a free and open society.

20 Your Honor, that was just, just his
21 knowledge before arriving to 210 Mountain; but what

1 about PFC Manning, what did he know based on the actual
2 analytic work product that he was required to perform?

3 He had extensive experience studying enemy
4 TTP, both pre-deployment and during his deployment.

5 At Ft. Drum he conducted weekly briefings
6 to his superiors on worldwide threats and specific
7 threats in Afghanistan and Iraq.

8 He was very good at computers. One of his
9 strengths was data mining.

10 Data mining was critical to the enemy
11 predictive analysis that you've heard about, that study
12 of an enemy trend to be able to predict their future
13 activities.

14 Mr. Hall testified as an expert, said that
15 PFC Manning would have been aware, he would have been
16 aware that the enemy engaged in similar pattern
17 analysis about the US TTPs and movements.

18 PFC Manning acknowledges his own
19 understanding of the value of the information that he
20 passed to WikiLeaks by claiming the SigActs for Iraq
21 and Afghanistan are, "possibly one of the most --" or

1 excuse me -- "one of the more significant documents of
2 our time. Removing the fog of war and revealing the
3 true nature of 21st century asymmetric warfare."

4 Prosecution Exhibit 42.

5 Your Honor, in addition to his training and
6 work product, PFC Manning kept different military
7 publications on external hard drive that showed he was
8 not naive or an ignorant soldier but one who
9 methodically kept track of information, including the
10 information regarding the use as weapons of
11 pro-insurgent web sites by the enemy.

12 The methodology the enemy uses on the
13 internet to further the anti-US causes, including cyber
14 mining for intelligence. Information warfare in the
15 form of propaganda is a well-known enemy tactic.

16 His possession of all the above data
17 information is additional circumstantial evidence that
18 PFC Manning had actual knowledge leading to the only
19 reasonable inference that he knew by disclosing this
20 information to WikiLeaks, an organization he knew would
21 release any information he was providing them to the

1 public. He was giving the information to the enemy and
2 specifically al-Qaeda and the al-Qaeda at the Arabian
3 Peninsula.

4 PFC Manning's knowledge of the enemy using
5 the internet was further developed, Your Honor, in his
6 own searching for repeated reading and habitual
7 compromising of the classified information pertaining
8 to WikiLeaks website.

9 He read three different intellectual
10 reports that explicitly told him that the enemy will
11 read anything posted on WikiLeaks.

12 First, Your Honor, the ACIC report. As I
13 already discussed, PFC Manning first accessed this
14 basic website on 19 November 2009 and then viewed the
15 document, the document being Prosecution Exhibit 45 and
16 46, on 1 December 2009.

17 So what did PFC Manning learn from that
18 document? That WikiLeaks represented a potential force
19 protection, counterintelligence, OPSEC and INFOSEC
20 threat.

21 Unauthorized release of classified

1 documents provide foreign intelligence services and
2 terrorist groups potential actual information against
3 the United States.

4 That they post all the information they
5 receive without editorial oversight.

6 That a reader must presume, they must
7 presume foreign adversaries will read and assess any
8 information.

9 PFC Manning also appreciated the value of
10 the ACIC document in cyber intelligence reporting.

11 On 15 March 2010 PFC Manning sent an e-mail
12 to Captain Lim and Captain Martin and Chief Balonek and
13 others in the S2 shop stating, quote, occasionally has
14 good hits from extremist website in ROE founded earlier
15 this morning, end quote.

16 And then to provide the ACIC website in his
17 e-mail, http colon slash slash ACIC portal dot north
18 slash inscom dot Army dot smil dot mil. This e-mail is
19 contained on PE12, PFC Manning's dot 22 SIPRNET
20 computer. PFC Manning read this document on five
21 occasions and he also compromised this document to

1 WikiLeaks.

2 Second, Your Honor, NCIRR. As I already
3 discussed. PFC Manning first PE99 after conducting a
4 search for WikiLeaks on Intelink on 1 December 2009.
5 On 14 February 2010 he downloaded the report and
6 disclosed it to WikiLeaks.

7 So what did he learn from this IRR. That
8 WikiLeaks self-described uncensorable Wikipedia for
9 untracable mass document leading and analysis.

10 WikiLeaks in 2008 had garnered the
11 attention of major news media outlets but not
12 intelligence reporting within the United States because
13 it was largely north.

14 Interesting enough, Your Honor, the IRR
15 also included contact information for the NCIS cyber
16 security office.

17 If PFC Manning had any questions about the
18 threat WikiLeaks posed to our National Security he
19 could have reached out for clarification which he
20 clearly did not do.

21 However, Your Honor, we do know what he

1 did, he kept Julian Assange's contact information and
2 he reached out to them in November of 2009 instead of
3 seeking clarification if he actually doubted what he
4 read.

5 Third, Your Honor, the C3 trip report. As
6 I already discussed, PFC Manning's first would have
7 viewed the C3 report, Prosecution Exhibit 43, after
8 conducting a search for WikiLeaks on Intelink or after
9 January 2010. On 14 February 2010 he downloaded the
10 report and disclosed it to WikiLeaks.

11 So what did he learn from the C3 report,
12 Your Honor? On page 2, quote, the internet is an
13 essential communication tool for terrorists, end quote.
14 That WikiLeaks is a publicly accessible internet
15 website where individuals submit leaked information and
16 have it published to the public anonymously without
17 fear of being held legally liable.

18 Information that can be disclosed includes,
19 but not limited, classified information and then on
20 page 3, Your Honor, on page 3 of the C3 report,
21 WikiLeaks poses a large threat not only from the actual

1 external disclosure, but from the insider, the insider
2 would be able to easily leak information without fear
3 of any direct individual repercussions.

4 PFC Manning read these three different
5 reports on multiple occasions during his deployment and
6 he chose to compromise those reports.

7 By reading and disclosing these three
8 documents he knew at a minimum that WikiLeaks had a
9 self-admitted reputation for encouraging leaks of
10 classified information for the United States Government
11 and releasing that information.

12 By reading and disclosing these three
13 documents PFC Manning knew at a minimum that any
14 website that posts anything it received would be used
15 by the enemy.

16 These documents, coupled with his
17 intelligence training on the means and methods that
18 al-Qaeda and the Arabian Peninsula employ, PFC Manning
19 knew the exact type of information he chose to disclose
20 would be useful to the enemy.

21 PFC Manning knew the informations existence

1 on the internet would actively encourage our nation's
2 enemy to gather and data mine the information just like
3 he had to do for his country as an intelligence
4 analyst.

5 This is particularly true, Your Honor, in
6 light of PFC Manning's specific training on al-Qaeda at
7 ART, 210 Mountain, JRTC rotations and in-theater.

8 His own words informed his actual
9 knowledge, Your Honor, deliberate acts of disclosure to
10 WikiLeaks would inevitably result in our nation's enemy
11 possessing the compromised materials. His own
12 statements document knowledge. By giving the
13 information to WikiLeaks (inaudible), PFC Manning knew
14 the information had a global scope and he was creating
15 worldwide anarchy and that was a beautiful and
16 horrifying thing to him. Global scope worldwide
17 anarchy and that was a beautiful and horrifying thing.

18 That's page 9, Your Honor, of the Lamo
19 chats.

20 These are not the words of a humanist, but
21 these are the words of an anarchist.

1 PFC Manning knew how WikiLeaks held
2 themselves out to the world, quote, like you're the
3 first intelligence agency for the general public, end
4 quote. Page 9, Assange chats.

5 On page 10 of the Assange chats, Julian
6 Assange specifically states to PFC Manning that, quote,
7 WikiLeaks described itself as the first intelligence
8 agency of the people. Better principle and less
9 parochial than any Government intelligence agencies.
10 It is able to be more accurate and relevant. It has no
11 commercial or national interests at heart. It is only
12 interested in the revelation of the truth. Unlike the
13 covert activities at state intelligence agencies,
14 WikiLeaks relies upon the power of overt fact.

15 Your Honor, PFC Manning's work with an
16 intelligence agency of the people is not an act of a
17 person trying to spark a national debate but rather an
18 act of a soldier, a soldier of the United States Army
19 that has no longer loyalty to his country because he
20 had no, no national interest at heart.

21 PFC Manning depended on WikiLeaks posting

1 whatever he disclosed to them on the internet.

2 Additionally, PFC Manning's chats with
3 Adrian Lamo informed his knowledge of WikiLeaks and the
4 effects of his actions.

5 He called WikiLeaks a group of FOI
6 activists, he knew the compromise of Department of
7 State cables would affect everybody on earth.

8 He noted, again, Your Honor, that Hillary
9 Clinton and several thousand diplomats around the world
10 are going to have a heart attack when they wake up one
11 morning and find an entire repository of classified
12 foreign policies available and in searchable format for
13 the public.

14 He created the searchable format for the
15 public, the public included the enemy and he knew that,
16 Your Honor, as an intelligence analyst.

17 He even acknowledged that, quote, could
18 have sold the information to Russia and China but chose
19 not to because it's public data. And because another
20 state would take advantage of the information and try
21 to get some edge.

1 This isn't public data, Your Honor. This
2 is United States Government classified information he
3 was trained to use to protect our soldiers and knew the
4 effects of his actions.

5 Your Honor, this simple acknowledgement by
6 PFC Manning shows that he understood the utility and
7 financial value of this information and how foreign
8 entities desired the information.

9 Your Honor, the defense would like you to
10 believe that PFC Manning actually wanted to spark
11 change and reform. However, PFC Manning never once
12 mentioned protecting the American public or the United
13 States as being any sort of motivation for his crimes
14 in any of his chats or e-mails.

15 Simply put, if PFC Manning had given the
16 information to Russia or China, he would have made an
17 incredible amount of money according to him. If
18 nothing else, he was skilled in constructing post
19 justifications to his acts that were not based in
20 facts, actual actions themselves, the actions that
21 we're discussing here. This is true for the evidence

1 defense elicited in the McNamara chats and Lamo chats.
2 Based on his actions, Your Honor, admissions to Assange
3 and Lamo, his predeployment admission to Ms. Showman,
4 PFC Manning had no allegiance to the United States and
5 the flag it stands for.

6 You heard the testimony from Ms. Showman
7 that during a predeployment counseling session she
8 pointed to the American flag on her shoulder and asked
9 PFC Manning what that flag meant to him.

10 His answer, that flag meant nothing to him.
11 He had no allegiance to any people. Similar words to
12 one who is an anarchist.

13 Ms. Showman testified that after this
14 incident she notified Sergeant Mitchell and Master
15 Sergeant Adkins.

16 And, Your Honor, you heard, although
17 suffering from memory problems, that Master Sergeant
18 Adkins testified that he remembered signing his
19 administrative reduction board appeal, that document
20 which occurred two years ago, and on that appeal he
21 recalled Ms. Showman telling him about the incident and

1 him reporting that incident to Major Clawson, his boss
2 at the time.

3 PFC Manning did have a general evil intent,
4 Your Honor, which was manifested through his deliberate
5 and repeated compromise of classified information. His
6 wholesale disclosure of information from databases that
7 he could not have even read all the information then.
8 Based on the general evil intent PFC Manning knowingly
9 gave through WikiLeaks al-Qaeda and the al-Qaeda
10 Arabian Peninsula specific intelligence which was found
11 in their possession.

12 Your Honor, there's no dispute that
13 information from the CIDNE-A database, specifically the
14 SIGACTS, certain Department of State cables and the
15 Apache video are intelligence. And that intelligence
16 was received by al-Qaeda and the al-Qaeda in the
17 Arabian Peninsula.

18 As the Court is aware, intelligence means
19 any information which is helpful to the enemy and true,
20 at least in part.

21 First, Your Honor, the CIDNE-A SIGACTS,

1 Your Honor, according to stipulation of fact for Osama
2 bin Laden on 2 May the United States Government
3 officials raided UBL's compound located in Pakistan and
4 collected several items of digital media. On that
5 media was first a letter from UBL to a member of
6 al-Qaeda requesting that member gather Department of
7 State cables posted to WikiLeaks.

8 And then also a letter from the same member
9 of al-Qaeda to UBL attached to which were the SIGACTS
10 from the CIDNE-A database as posted by WikiLeaks.

11 The classified version of the stipulation
12 of fact, Your Honor, Prosecution Exhibit 153 Bravo, 153
13 Bravo explains exactly what Osama bin Laden asked for
14 and what he exactly received.

15 Second, Your Honor, the Apache video in a
16 video released about al-Assad media organization
17 operated by al-Qaeda. Adam Gadahn showed the edited
18 version of the Apache video which PFC Manning disclosed
19 to WikiLeaks.

20 The stipulation of fact for Adam Gadahn,
21 Prosecution Exhibit 182, explains the terrorist video

1 in which excerpts of the WikiLeaks Apache video weren't
2 present.

3 Third, Your Honor, Department of State
4 information was in the hands of two different enemies
5 of the United States: Osama bin Laden and Adam Gadahn.

6 According to the stipulation of fact for
7 Osama bin Laden, Prosecution Exhibit 153, during the
8 raid of his compound United States Government officials
9 also collected Department of State cables information
10 released by PFC Manning.

11 Your Honor, the classified Department of
12 State cables found in UBL's possession is in
13 Prosecution Exhibit 173 Charlie. And this document
14 makes it clear that in the year of its publication, the
15 intelligence community understood certain capabilities
16 of the enemy and PFC Manning himself ignored those
17 indicators when deciding to compromise all the
18 classification.

19 Prosecution Exhibit 173 Charlie, in the
20 same terrorist recruitment video released by al-Assad
21 and Adam Gadahn also showed the Department of State

1 cables information contained from PFC Manning and
2 WikiLeaks.

3 Prosecution Exhibit 174 Bravo and Charlie
4 described in-depth the Department of State cables
5 information present in the Gadahn video.

6 In order, Your Honor, for the intelligence
7 104 article, the purpose of the information must be
8 helpful or useful to the enemy. How is this material
9 helpful to the enemy?

10 CIDNE-A, Your Honor, you heard testimony
11 that CIDNE-A contains tactical information about how we
12 fight our wars and our enemy inflict damage on our
13 soldiers.

14 This is our playback, a snapshot unit, TTP,
15 battle drills and call signs. With this information
16 the enemy now knows how each individual unit, company
17 to division, who deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan between
18 2004 and 2009 executes its wartime mission.

19 United States faces enemies worldwide and
20 not just in Iraq and Afghanistan. IEDs are not unique
21 to those theaters. Now PFC Manning provided any enemy

1 of the United States worldwide this data.

2 The SIGACTS from CIDNE-A details whether
3 the enemy was successful in the attacks against US
4 forces, if a specific IED did or did not work.

5 The enemy can now use the factual
6 information from the reports to develop their own TTP
7 to better employ IEDs against the United States.

8 This is the exact same process, Your Honor,
9 that PFC Manning was trained and used when he
10 determined the safest route or the highest density of
11 IED's for his commander.

12 You heard from Commander Aboul-Enein that
13 acknowledgement of successful attacks against US forces
14 boosts the morale within al-Qaeda and may lead to
15 increase in attacks. This, too, Your Honor, applies
16 worldwide. There is no question why UBL himself wanted
17 this material based on that type of information and he
18 received it.

19 The Apache video. Your Honor, you heard
20 testimony from Commander Aboul-Enein that media
21 perception is important to al-Qaeda and any event that

1 places al-Qaeda in a positive light or US forces in
2 negative light is beneficial to al-Qaeda.

3 The edited and released version of the
4 Apache video is obviously a video that al-Qaeda can use
5 in propaganda.

6 Terrorist organizations now have it, proven
7 by Adam Gadahn calling on all Jihadists to view the
8 video and war against United States.

9 PFC Manning knew this would happen from his
10 training when he taught, when he was taught, excuse me,
11 Your Honor, that within the last 10 years the number of
12 terrorists web sites have jumped from 100 to as many as
13 4,000 and in recruitment.

14 PFC Manning (inaudible). Department of
15 State cables, you heard testimony from Commander
16 Aboul-Enein that events that undermine the foreign
17 leaders, excuse me, cooperation with foreign leaders,
18 Your Honor, would create an environment, an environment
19 which terrorists, ideology excels through al-Qaeda.

20 The Department of State cables captures
21 candid discussions with foreign leaders and has a

1 potential to create the type of hostile environment.

2 Even PFC Manning himself recognized this in
3 his chat with Adrian Lamo when he stated that line
4 about Hillary Clinton and the several thousand
5 diplomats.

6 This was even obvious to Osama bin Laden,
7 who wanted this material and he received it, and he
8 received it, asked for this type of material and
9 received it, and he was in the most isolated regions
10 within Pakistan, Your Honor.

11 PFC Manning also understood the enemy's
12 ability to data mine for information.

13 As Mr. Hall testified, all junior analysts
14 know that enemy conducts particular analysis based on
15 data it can access and the enemy does this through data
16 mining.

17 PFC Manning knew this when he decided to
18 make the information available to the enemy in the
19 format he made it available.

20 Your Honor, Inspire magazine, a magazine
21 published on the internet by al-Qaeda in the Arabian

1 Peninsula. Inspire magazine serves as a propaganda
2 tool.

3 On 16 January 2010, Inspire magazine
4 published Issue No. 4, Winter 2010 edition on the
5 internet. On pages 44 and 45 of that issue, the
6 magazine lists activities in western Jihadist to wage
7 Jihad against the United States and the west.

8 Specifically, the magazine pointed out that
9 archiving large amounts of information is helpful to
10 AQAP and it further lists, "anything useful from
11 WikiLeaks is useful for archiving."

12 Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
13 recognized the value that PFC Manning made available to
14 them through WikiLeaks and directed its followers to
15 perform essentially the same function that PFC Manning
16 did for the United States, data mine for information
17 they could use.

18 Your Honor, the CIDNE-A SIGACTS, Department
19 of State cables information, the Apache video are all
20 information that is of value to the enemy and thus
21 intelligence.

1 PFC Manning knew who the enemy was and what
2 type of information they sought, specifically
3 classified information and tactical information.

4 He knew that the enemy used the internet
5 and that WikiLeaks was helpful to our enemies.

6 He knew that WikiLeaks website commonly
7 contained classified official US Government information
8 and for that reason was commonly visited by the enemy
9 like any other website like that.

10 PFC Manning was well-informed of how
11 WikiLeaks operated. He searched for WikiLeaks more
12 than 100 times on Intelink during his deployment or, as
13 you heard earlier, roughly four searches for every five
14 days in theater.

15 He knew that anything that he disclosed to
16 WikiLeaks would be posted on the internet and he knew
17 that foreign adversaries will review and access DoD
18 sensitive or classified information posted to the
19 WikiLeaks website.

20 PFC Manning posed that question, Your
21 Honor, to Adrian Lamo in his chats: If you had

1 unprecedented access to classified networks 14 hours a
2 day, 7 days a week for 8 plus months what would you do?

3 PFC Manning asked that question six months
4 after he starting exfiltrating information from the
5 SIPRNET. He asked that question six months after he
6 knowingly provided intelligence leaks about the United
7 States through WikiLeaks. (inaudible). He asked that
8 question six months after researching WikiLeaks on
9 Intelink and other classified databases and watching
10 the effects of previous disclosures yet continuing to
11 disclose.

12 PFC Manning provided his answer to Adrian
13 Lamo on page 8, Your Honor, of his chat: "Let's just
14 say someone I know intimately well has been penetrating
15 US classified networks, mining data like the ones
16 described, and then transferring that data from the
17 classified networks over the air gap onto a commercial
18 network computer, sorting the data, compressing,
19 encrypting it, and uploading it to a crazy white haired
20 aussie who can't seem to stay in one country very
21 long."

1 What you did not see, Your Honor, in those
2 chats with Julian Assange or Lauren McNamara is that he
3 had a duty to his country and a specific duty to
4 protect classified information and other sensitive
5 information and with this access that he work hard to
6 assist his fellow soldiers that are in enemy sites.

7 PFC Manning never took pause when divulging
8 to Adrian Lamo that he had created a massive mess and
9 no one, his own words, Your Honor, no one had a clue
10 because 95 percent of the efforts are on physical
11 security of classified networks and managing
12 operational security on unclassified networks.

13 That's on Lamo page 8 of his charts.

14 PFC Manning was an anarchist whose agenda
15 was made abundantly clear almost immediately after he
16 deployed to Iraq. He was not naive.

17 Each time he downloaded and transmitted
18 closely-held information he made deliberate decisions
19 to break ranks with his nation throwing all his
20 training and experience aside and releasing that
21 information to the world.

1 He used his access to classified networks
2 that Julian Assange claimed held the alleged covert
3 activities of state intelligence agencies and made
4 those secrets overt fact for the world to view, all the
5 while knowing the world included progressive and
6 technologically savvy enemies that used any US
7 Government information against our nation.

8 Your Honor, in the Assange chats, page 5,
9 page 5, PFC Manning boasts on his knowledge that, "the
10 more the Government controls information, the harder
11 the Government tries, the more violently the
12 information wants to get out."

13 Your Honor, the information did not just
14 ooze from the SIPRNET onto the World Wide Web for the
15 enemy to access, but was the precise outcome that PFC
16 Manning desired when he took the deliberate steps to
17 disclose over 700,000 documents by moving that
18 information one disk at a time from SIPRNET to his
19 personal Mac bridging that air gap.

20 Your Honor, rather than focusing on his war
21 fighting mission, he made the decision to disclose the

1 700,000 from SIPRNET knowing that once WikiLeaks
2 received the information they would release it for the
3 world to access and he knew the world included the
4 enemies of the United States.

5 He was not a naive or well0intentioned
6 soldier.

7 Your Honor, a well-intentioned soldier does
8 not claim that: "The State Department fucked itself.
9 Placed volumes and volumes of information in a single
10 spot with no security."

11 Lamo chats, Your Honor, page 41.

12 Or, have a conversation recognizing that
13 the only people you trust can fuck you, info-wise at
14 least.

15 Lamo chats, Your Honor, page 41.

16 This recognition of system weaknesses and
17 the active and deliberate exploitation of those
18 weaknesses are not the acts of the naive and
19 well-intentioned soldier, but one who acts in a
20 calculated manner and for his own purposes.

21 The only naivety PFC Manning shows, Your

1 Honor, throughout his entire endeavor was that despite
2 admitting to his crimes and multiple chats, making
3 admissions of e-mails, keeping trophies of his handy
4 work and not forensically wiping his machine daily, he
5 actually thought he would get away with what he did and
6 he wouldn't get caught.

7 PFC Manning is a United States Army
8 intelligence analyst that the United States trained and
9 trusted to use multiple intelligence systems to provide
10 real time information to leaders on the battlefield and
11 he used that training to defy our trust and
12 indiscriminately and systematically harvested over
13 700,000 documents from the SIPRNET during a time of war
14 and while deployed in Iraq in support of that war.

15 Showing no loyalty to this nation, PFC
16 Manning knowingly gave the enemies of the United States
17 unfettered access to these Government documents and we
18 now know today, Your Honor, as part of this court
19 martial that at least two enemies, at least two enemies
20 received the information; including Osama bin Laden,
21 who at the time of his death was the most isolated and

1 wanted enemy of the United States, and al-Qaeda in the
2 Arabian Peninsula.

3 Your Honor, the United States is confident
4 that after reviewing all of the evidence, applying your
5 own common sense knowledge of human nature and the ways
6 of the world and specifically spending time focused on
7 PFC Manning's own words in his chats that you will find
8 him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all the charges
9 and their specifications.

10 Your Honor, PFC Manning was not a humanist;
11 he was a hacker. A hacker who described his fellow
12 soldiers as dikes, a bunch of hyper-masculine,
13 trigger-happy, ignorant, rednecks or gullable idiots.

14 Lamo chats, Your Honor, page 7 and 37, 7
15 and 37. Assange chats, page 8.

16 Your Honor, he was not a troubled young
17 sole. He was a determined soldier with a knowledge,
18 ability, and desire to harm the United States in its
19 war effort. And, Your Honor, he was not a
20 whistleblower; he was a traitor. A traitor who
21 understood the value of compromised information in the

1 hands of the enemy and took deliberate steps to ensure
2 they, along with the world, received all of it.

3 Thank you, Your Honor.

4 THE COURT: All right. Is there anything
5 we need to address before we recess until 09:30?

6 MR. COOMBS: No, Your Honor.

7 MR. FEIN: No, Your Honor.

8 THE COURT: Court is in recess.

9 (Court recessed at 5:45 p.m.)
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